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ABSTRACT
Why do religious politics thrive in some societies but not others? This paper explores the 
institutional foundations of this process in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim democracy. We 
show that a major Islamic institution, the waqf, fostered the entrenchment of political Islam at a 
critical historical juncture. In the early 1960s, rural elites transferred large amounts of land into 
waqf—a type of inalienable charitable trust—to avoid expropriation by the government as part of 
a major land reform effort. Although the land reform was later undone, the waqf properties 
remained. We show that greater intensity of the planned reform led to more prevalent waqf land 
and Islamic institutions endowed as such, including religious schools, which are strongholds of 
the Islamist movement. We identify lasting effects of the reform on electoral support for Islamist 
parties, preferences for religious candidates, and the adoption of Islamic legal regulations 
(sharia). Overall, the land reform contributed to the resilience and eventual rise of political Islam 
by helping to spread religious institutions, thereby solidifying the alliance between local elites 
and Islamist groups. These findings shed new light on how religious institutions may shape 
politics in modern democracies.
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1 Introduction
Religion, “the heart of a heartless world” (Marx, 1844), has been an important part of human existence
throughout history. Since the end of the Cold War, the rise of religion in politics led many to predict
the twenty-first century would be “God’s Century” (Toft et al., 2011). While this phenomenon has af-
fected every major religious tradition, support for religious politics varies widely between and within
societies. A particularly intriguing case is that of Islamism, support for which differs dramatically across
the Muslim world.1
The literature on the economics of religion provides a wealth of evidence on how religious values and
politics shape human behavior and development (Barro and McCleary, 2003). For instance, Becker and
Woessmann (2009) and Cantoni et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate the link between religion and economic
development, while Kuran (2011), Michalopoulos et al. (2016), and Rubin (2011) study this relationship
for Islam specifically.2 Others link economic risk to the intensity of religious practice (Ager and Ciccone,
2018; Bentzen, forthcoming; Chen, 2010). Still others explore the role of religion in mediating economic
shocks and the dynamics of institutional change (Belloc et al., 2016; Chaney, 2013).
However, much less is known about why some societies—often within the same religious tradition—
embrace religious politics while others do not. To explain the resurgence of religious politics in the late
twentieth century, the literature has traditionally emphasized the perceived failure of the secular state to
address economic grievances and to uphold moral and civic values when confronted with the disrupting
forces of globalization (Almond et al., 2003; Juergensmeyer, 1993, 2010). Yet, this does not address what
we argue is a puzzle: Why do religious individuals manage to become influential political forces in
some settings but not in others? How do religious actors gain political prominence, and what are the
mechanisms linking religion and political outcomes?
This paper identifies institutions as a fundamental cause of religious influence in politics. We hypoth-
esize that specific religious institutions can nurture support for political activism by religious actors, and
in doing so, shape the nature and the success of religious politics. We believe this is an important con-
tribution to our understanding of the economics of religion. In Islam as in other spiritual traditions,
religious institutions may affect the ability of political actors to form coalitions, to mobilize for or against
certain reforms, and to seize political power.3
We use a natural historical experiment in the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia, to estimate
the long-run effect of Islamic institutions on the success of religious politics. Our empirical analysis
exploits the aborted Indonesian land reform of 1960 known as the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL). Building
1Following Euben and Zaman, eds (2009, pg.4), we define Islamist movements as those which make the Islamic doctrine a
central part of their political platform, and which “attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the Muslim community,
excavating and reinterpreting them for application to the present-day social and political world.” We also use Islamism and
political Islam interchangeably throughout the paper in reference to Islamist movements. Kurzman and Naqvi (2010) and
Cammett and Luong (2014) document the considerable variation in support for Islamist parties across Muslim countries.
2Recent studies explore the impact of specific Islamic practices such as pilgrimage (Clingingsmith et al., 2009) and fasting
(Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015) on social and economic well-being.
3A relevant historical example is the Non Expedit given to Catholics by Pope Pius IX in 19th-century Italy, which explicitly
prohibited Catholics from voting and standing in parliamentary elections. Similarly, within Islam, there are longstanding
debates about whether participation in elections is religiously permissible, given that some see political parties as contributing
to the division of the Muslim community (see Hasan, 2009).
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on recent studies that estimate the long-term effects of “accidents of history” at specific critical junctures
(Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2012), we identify the consequences of events around this episode for
the persistence of the Islamist movement in Indonesia. As part of this reform attempt, the Sukarno
government challenged conservative and largely hostile rural landowners by attempting to redistribute
land to landless households, who represented 60% of the rural population at the time (Soemardjan, 1962;
Utrecht, 1969). The government’s efforts to redistribute land largely failed, but the attempted reform
fostered an alliance between landed elites and religious interests that continues to shape politics today.
In particular, the BAL exempted religious lands held in Islamic charitable trust—known as waqf (plural
awqaf )—from redistribution. Knowing this, many large landowners transferred expropriable land to
waqf endowments under the authority of local religious leaders. We show that areas targeted by the
land reform exhibit more pervasive waqf and institutions endowed as such, including Islamic boarding
schools and mosques. Moreover, targeted regions exhibit greater support for Islamist political parties
and more extensive local Islamic law (i.e., sharia regulations) in the contemporary era of democracy and
decentralized governance.
To estimate the effect of the land reform on subsequent outcomes, we use a differences-in-discontinuity
design analogous to Grembi et al. (2016). This specification leverages two sources of identifying varia-
tion. First, as in a standard regression discontinuity (RD) design, we exploit discontinuous policy varia-
tion at the population density threshold used to determine the intensity of expropriation under the BAL.
Districts with a population density above 400 people/km2 were to experience more redistribution un-
der the reform: the maximum size of individual holdings was set at 5 hectares of irrigated land and 6
hectares of dry land, as opposed to 7.5 and 9 hectares for irrigated and dry land in districts with a pop-
ulation density under 400 people/km2.4 Second, we exploit cross-sectional variation in the number of
marginal landholdings—holdings between 5–7.5 hectares of irrigated land and between 6–9 hectares of
dry land—namely the landholdings to be confiscated in districts above 400 people/km2. Our main spec-
ification thus identifies effects of the reform by measuring the difference in outcomes between districts
with and without a large number of marginal landholdings, and by estimating whether this difference
changes discontinuously at the threshold used to determine the intensity of expropriation. We validate
the design by showing that the main identifying assumptions of both RD and difference-in-differences
(DID) hold in our setup. We show that observables are continuous at the 400 people/km2 threshold,
and we run placebo checks to test the parallel trends assumptions for districts with and without a large
number of marginal landholdings.
Crucially for our research design, the land reform excluded land held in waqf from redistribution. A
widely adopted institution in Muslim societies, the waqf has been the subject of a large historical litera-
ture and was famously described by Kuran (2001, 2011) as a major factor behind economic stagnation in
the Middle East. While a charitable institution in name, the waqf has been used throughout history as a
protection against the threat of expropriation by the state rather than as a vehicle for redistribution (Ab-
basi, 2012; Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2012; Gil, 1998; Sharon, 1966; Singer, 2008). In the same manner, the
exemption of religious lands in the BAL led wealthy landowners to protect their assets by transferring
4This is the most widely applicable threshold for expropriation under the law. However, for robustness, we also consider
another much lower threshold at 50 people/km2 that applied in more sparsely populated regions of the country.
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them to religious institutions endowed as waqf in districts targeted by the anticipated reform.
Using the empirical strategy described above, we show that forty years onwards, significantly more
land is held in waqf in districts where landholders were most threatened by the reform—districts with
population density above 400 people/km2 and a large number of marginal landholdings. This stands
in contrast to the lack of any systematic long-run effects of the reform on land inequality, which is due
to the fact that most expropriated lands had been retaken during the late 1960s as the land reform was
largely undone and reversed (Huizer, 1972; Utrecht, 1969). However, this was not the case for religious
lands held in waqf since the sanctity of the institution made it extremely difficult if not impossible to
change the status of these lands.
This shock to the scope of awqaf, we argue, is critical to explain variation in support for political Islam
in contemporary Indonesia. Districts that experienced a greater increase in the creation of waqf endow-
ments as a result of the 1960 reform also provided greater support for Islamist political parties in leg-
islative elections several decades later. In the first free and fair election of the democratic era beginning
in 1999, we identify stronger support for hardline Islamist parties, including the United Development
Party, which was the main vehicle for Islamist aspirations during the repressive authoritarian period
of Suharto rule (1967–1998). Post-Suharto, such parties advocated for an Islamic state and rejected the
national ideology of Pancasila, which promotes a secular and inclusive vision for Indonesia. In areas
most affected by the land reform, support for these Islamist parties persisted in subsequent democratic
elections after 1999 at the expense of more moderate Islamic parties that embraced Pancasila.
Why would an increase in the amount of land held in waqf in 1960 impact contemporary support
for Islamist parties? We argue that the long-term effects of the waqf are intimately tied to its specific
institutional features and its ability to sustain a variety of Islamic organizations over time. Waqf lands
are inalienable under Islamic law and provide a great degree of autonomy from the state. In the In-
donesian context, the waqf helped solidify and deepen the alliance between local elites and the Islamist
groups that continue to play an important role in Indonesian politics. We show that districts targeted
by the land reform exhibit more pervasive mosques and Islamic boarding schools known as pesantren.
These institutions are key conduits for Islamist ideas and action. Unlike other Islamic schools (known
as madrasas), pesantren are entirely privately funded, maintain their own curriculum, and remain outside
the purview of government oversight (McVey, 1983).5 Drawing on work by scholars of contemporary
Indonesian politics, we argue that pesantren are central to the local organization of political Islam today.
Importantly, the effects we find are not limited to electoral support for Islamist parties, but also ex-
tend to voters’ preferences for religious candidates and actual implementation of Islamic law. Using
recent data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), we show that respondents in districts tar-
geted by the land reform are more likely to say that a candidate’s religion and religiosity influence their
voting decisions. These results corroborate our findings on electoral outcomes. They are also consequen-
tial for policy. Since democratization in 1998, local governments in districts more exposed to the land
reform are more likely to adopt Islamic legal regulations (sharia), which have potentially far-reaching
5In 2012/13, roughly 3.8 million or around 7.3% of all students across Indonesia were enrolled in pesantren according to the
Ministry of Education. While pesantren are similar to madrasas found elsewhere in the Muslim world, in Indonesia are more
conservative, traditional, and focused on producing the next generation of Islamic scholars, preachers, and leaders.
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social and economic implications.6 These results point to the influence of Islamists on the political pro-
cess even when they are not in power, as many of these regulations were adopted by local governments
controlled by secular parties indebted to Islamist movements for their success at the ballot box. In the
last section of the paper, we present further evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the waqf is what
links the land reform and support for Islamist politics today rather than alternative pathways related to
underdevelopment, public goods provision, changes in land inequality, or violence in the mid-1960s.
Across spiritual traditions, religious institutions provide stability and secrecy to the individuals who
operate them, which makes them ideal venues for political activism. We hypothesize that three char-
acteristics of the institutions we study caused their outsized influence in Indonesian politics and could
similarly define the role of clerical institutions in other contexts. First, inalienable religious institutions
can protect particular groups during sustained periods of political oppression, allowing them to survive
until they can again compete or seek indirect influence in the political arena. This was true historically
not only for Islamist movements under hostile regimes (Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey), but also, for example,
for conservative movements associated with the Roman Catholic Church such as the Opus Dei. Second,
institutions that attract charitable giving are bound to foster opportunistic alliances between elites and
religious interest groups to influence law and policymaking.7 Third, religious institutions outside gov-
ernment purview can be used to foment opposition to the state. In the same way that pesantren have
nurtured support for Islamism in Indonesia, there is widespread anecdotal evidence that temples in
India have been used to cultivate Hindu nationalism.8
Related Literature. Overall, our paper contributes new insights to the political economy literature
on religious institutions and politics. Chaney (2013) shows in historical Egypt that economic down-
turns increase the political power of religious leaders through the threat of collective action against the
state. Belloc et al. (2016) explore the role of religion in mediating institutional change in medieval Italy.
Michalopoulos et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that the egalitarian and redistributive nature of
Islam, especially its rules governing inheritance, help explain the religion’s rapid historical expansion
through trade networks. Iyer (2016) provides a detailed summary of other work on the economics of re-
ligion, noting an important puzzle, namely the persistence of religion despite the array of secular forces
and economic development that militate against it. Our findings suggest that the durability of religious
institutions and their role in organizing politically significant voting blocks may be especially important
factors in understanding the rise of Islamism today. This echoes a theme in Rubin (2017), whose work,
like that of Chaney (2013), suggests that Islamic authorities were granted a large say in politics histori-
cally as a result of the threat they posed to ruling elites. Our findings shed light on the microfoundations
6These regulations cover many facets of life, including, among others, the collection of alms, the banning of alcohol, and the
requirement that women wear the Islamic veil. We measure these sharia laws from 1998 to 2013 using district-level data from
Buehler (2016), who similarly argues that local variation in the institutional strength of Islamist groups is key to understand the
“Islamization of politics” in Indonesia. Our findings on sharia are important given the recent declining popularity of Islamist
parties at the polls while at the same time a growing influence of Islamist movements outside formal party politics.
7In the U.S., groups such as Priests for Life, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and the American Jewish Congress
“collectively spend over $350 million every year attempting to entrench religious values into the law” (Robinson, 2015).
8In 2015, the state of Kerala moved to forbid military drills (‘shakha’) on temple premises by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
Hindu nationalist group, triggering the opposition of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party party (Times of India, 5 June 2015).
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of this threat, which may be important today as democracy advances across the developing world.9
Our paper also adds to a wider social science literature on the rise of Islamist movements in pre-
dominantly Muslim societies (e.g., Berman, 2011; Blaydes and Linzer, 2011; Pepinsky et al., 2012). We
contribute to this literature by providing causal evidence on the institutional mechanisms driving the
emergence of Islamist groups. Iannaccone and Berman (2006) argue that participating in “extreme” re-
ligious behavior can screen out potential free-riders. This provides Islamist parties with a screening
technology that other parties may not have, which makes institutions like Indonesia’s Islamic boarding
schools (outside the purview of the state) particularly useful for political mobilization. Our results sug-
gest that institutions may be important for understanding why Islamism gradually rose to prominence
after a long period of marginalization (see, e.g., Lacroix, 2011; Wickham, 2002, 2013).
Finally, we add to a growing literature exploring the link between culture and institutions (Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015; Lowes et al., 2017; Tabellini, 2010). Numerous studies identify a relationship between
economic circumstances and religious culture (see comprehensive reviews in Chen and Hungerman,
2014; Iannaccone, 1998; Iyer, 2016). Much less is known about how religious institutions shape culture
and vice versa. While we cannot disentangle the two, our findings are consistent with a shock to religious
institutions in the 1960s feeding back onto religious culture during the authoritarian era, which then
facilitated further institutional change during the era of democracy and decentralization when Islamists
could influence politics more directly. These dynamics have potential implications for other countries
with deep religious cultures undergoing political openings.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide relevant background on the 1960 Indonesian
land reform and the waqf, respectively. Section 4 outlines our theoretical argument and describes the
different mechanisms through which waqf estates created as a result of the land reform might plausibly
impact contemporary outcomes. Section 5 describes our data and empirical strategy. Section 6 presents
our results and identification checks, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The 1960 Indonesian Land Reform
In the tumultuous decades after independence, the Sukarno regime sought to launch a major land re-
form aimed at empowering poor households across Indonesia. In this section, we provide relevant
background on this reform effort, known as the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960, which, as we later
document, inadvertently fostered the spread of Islamic institutions throughout the archipelago.
9Our findings also relate to Robinson (2015) who link the dissolution of religiously-owned monastery lands in 15th century
England to growth in innovation, agricultural commercialization, and industrial development. We find that religiously-owned
land played an important role in shaping political (but not economic) development even though that land did not cover the
vast swathes of territory it did in historical England or elsewhere in Muslim world (see Kuran, 2011). Other relevant work on
Islam includes Meyersson (2014), who shows that local Islamic rule increased female education in Turkey, and Henderson and
Kuncoro (2011), who argue that Islamic parties in local assemblies are associated with lower corruption in Indonesia. We offer
insight into how institutions may have helped these parties attain political power.
5
2.1 Land Inequality in Post-Independence Indonesia
The origins of the 1960 land reform lie in the pervasive inequality across Indonesia in the colonial era.
Under the Dutch, land was owned through a variety of property regimes, ranging from conventional
private property to a host of communal and religious property types recognized under the Dutch Agrar-
ian Law of 1870. Rural inequality was most pronounced in Java and Bali where the average landholder
cultivated no more than half a hectare and where 60% of cultivators were landless (Soemardjan, 1962).
Although the distribution of land in Indonesia was considerably more equal than in other agricultural
economies in the developing world (Montgomery and Sugito, 1980), large landowners were powerful
actors in the countryside. Post-independence, President Sukarno and his supporters attempted to do
away with the old colonial laws governing agriculture and to impose a technical solution that would ad-
dress landlessness by redistributing land away from large landholders, especially “absentee” landlords
(Soemardjan, 1962; Utrecht, 1969).
2.2 Design of the Land Reform
The Sukarno government first laid out its detailed plans for “the termination of proprietary rights on
land” in its August 1959 Political Manifesto address (Utrecht, 1969). This prompted fears among rural
landowners that comprehensive land redistribution would soon be implemented. These plans were
codified in the BAL (Number 5) introduced on 24 September 1960 and a subsequent law Number 56
introduced on 28 December 1960. The latter proposed floors and ceilings on private landholdings.10
The law distinguished different thresholds for “dry” land and “wet” irrigated land used largely for rice
cultivation (sawah), with surpluses in excess of cutoffs at the district level destined for redistribution to
landless peasants. Finally, a subsequent law (Number 224) introduced on 12 September 1961 stipulated
the (arguably unfavorable) terms of redistribution.11
Ceilings on the amount of land any individual could own were defined as a function of popula-
tion density at the district level. These arbitrary cutoffs, which inform our empirical strategy in Sec-
tion 5, stipulated that districts with more than 400 people/km2 could have maximum holdings of 5 (6)
hectares of wetland (dryland), districts with 251–400 people/km2 could have maximum holdings of 7.5
(9) hectares of wetland (dryland), districts with 51–250 people/km2 could have maximum holdings of
10 (12) hectares of wetland (dryland), and districts with less than or equal to 50 people/km2 could have
maximum holdings of 15 (20) hectares of wetland (dryland). The maximum allowable holdings could
not exceed 20 hectares anywhere in the country.
The regime knew that it faced significant political risks when it undertook the land reform and chose
10The basic floor of 2 hectares was to apply everywhere but was never actually feasible in practice given the limited land relative
to population in most areas of the country.
11The law No. 224 of 1961 detailed the actual course of implementation and indemnification for seized lands under the BAL of
1960. The fair price was set at 10 times the assessed annual profits from the land for the first five hectares and 9 times for the
next five hectare increments with 7 times for any remaining land beyond that. The government was supposed to deposit 10
percent of the payment in a public bank with the remainder in promissory notes that could be redeemed one year after the
land was redistributed. Beneficiaries of redistribution would have 16 years in which to pay the government to recoup these
costs. Landowners that refused redistribution would be sent to prison for 3 months and receive no indemnification. Huizer
(1972) provides further details on the law.
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not to antagonize religious elites by conceding that the law would not be contrary to religious law.
The original BAL (No. 5) stipulated that religiously-held lands, including all land under Islamic trusts
(waqf ), were exempt from redistribution.12 Utrecht (1969) describes this exemption of religious lands
from redistribution as a “serious impediment to land reform.” However, it is entirely consistent with
the literature on the waqf, which we discuss in detail below. This literature emphasizes that historically,
rulers throughout the Muslim world were hesitant to confiscate waqf properties because they feared the
consequences of seizing land “owned” by God (Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2012).13
2.3 Implementation and Failure of the Reform
While the government proceeded with detailed legislation stipulating how land was to be redistributed,
the unfavorable terms of redistribution, together with a lack of information on details of the BAL on the
ground and countless practical obstacles slowed the implementation of the reform. In the early 1960s,
peasant organizations linked to the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) led information
campaigns that met with variable success in Java and Bali, where the reform was to begin before pro-
ceeding to the Outer Islands (Huizer, 1972). However, local redistribution committees established under
the BAL did not become operational until September 1962, two years after the BAL was promulgated.
These village-level committees, overseen by the district government, were often composed of represen-
tatives of the local elite sympathetic with large landowners. As implementation of the reform stalled,
vigilante groups affiliated with the peasant movement began seizing property, which significantly esca-
lated tensions in the countryside (Utrecht, 1969). After a failed coup in October 1965 by junior officers
accused of being loyal to the PKI, mass violence spread throughout rural areas targeting “leftists” and
Sukarno’s supporters (Cribb, 2001; Farid, 2005; Roosa, 2006). The ensuing violence brought land reform
efforts to a standstill while most landowners took back their properties. This was not the case, how-
ever, for religious lands held in waqf since the sanctity of the institution made it extremely difficult if not
impossible to change the status of these lands.
Although the land reform was never formally repealed, a recent assessment of its legacy notes that
it faced innumerable technical and legal contradictions that undermined its ability to address rural in-
equality (Lucus and Warren, 2013). An evaluation of changes in the distribution of land between the
1963 and 1973 Agricultural Censuses concluded that “there appears to be no appreciable change be-
tween censuses in inequality of holdings of sawah [rice paddy] or dry land” (Montgomery and Sugito,
1980). Utrecht (1969) details a process by which the land reform stalled and was eventually undone by
the late 1960s in most parts of the country.14 He concludes that the “most formidable obstruction to
12Article 49 addresses the exemption, and point (3) stipulates that “Perwakafan tanah milik dilindungi dan diatur dengan Per-
aturan Pemerintah,” which translates “Waqf land with the right of ownership shall be protected and overseen by Government
Regulation.” The article was also construed to apply to land connected to Hindu temples or laba pura (Utrecht, 1969).
13The exemption of religious lands was a necessary concession to placate Islamic leaders who, in early discussions with the
Sukarno regime in the late 1950s, expressed strong reservation about restrictions on land ownership being in contradiction to
Islamic law (Mortimer, 2006). Sukarno was keen to avoid rekindling he violent Islamic fundamentalist uprisings of the 1950s,
rooted in the Darul Islam group’s attempt to establish an Islamic state.
14In Section 6.6, we provide corroborating evidence that the intensity of the reform effort did not lead to lower land inequality
in subsequent decades.
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land reform came from the religious organisations” that “arranged for the land surplus. . . to be donated
to religious institutions, the wakap [i.e., waqf ], through antedated acts of transfer.” It is this process
that underpins our main hypotheses linking the failed reform, the entrenchment of Islamic institutions
endowed in waqf, and contemporary support for Islamist parties and policies.
3 Background on the Waqf
This section provides general background on the Islamic institution linking the 1960 land reform to
contemporary support for political Islam, the waqf. We focus on its specific use in Indonesia and on
aspects most relevant to our empirical framework.
3.1 The Waqf in Islamic Law and History
Often described as a type of Islamic trust, the waqf is defined by the Encyclopedia of Islam as “the elements
that a person, with the intention of committing a pious deed, declares part of his or her property to
be henceforth unalienable and designates persons or public utilities as beneficiaries of its yields.” A
voluminous literature on the waqf argues that, ever since its introduction in Arabia soon after the death
of the Prophet Muhammad, the institution served as a protection against the threat of expropriation
by the state rather than as a vehicle for redistribution (Abbasi, 2012; Gil, 1998; Sharon, 1966; Singer,
2008; Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2012).15 The sanctity of the norm against expropriation of land in waqf is
illustrated in the first enduring record of a waqf from around 913 CE, which reads in part:
This [waqf] is inviolable. Fa’iq ibn ’Abd Allah the Sicilian has renounced it, and whoever
interferes in the distribution of these alms (sadaqa) and of this waqf or changes them, does
so without authority . . . . May Allah punish him for his bad deed, for verily he has taken
upon himself the burden of his sin and exposed himself to the anger of his Lord. . . . He who
interferes with [the regulations of] this [waqf] and who modifies it is warned of being struck
by a violent death in this world or by the chastisement of the fire of Hell.” (Sharon, 1966)
In principle, any Muslim can endow a waqf, a feature that made the institution popular among
women and former slaves, whose property was otherwise vulnerable after their death (Fay, 1997; Sha-
ham, 2000). Despite this appeal to these more disadvantaged groups, in practice, endowing a waqf re-
quired significant resources and was an institution of the wealthy. All waqf properties required funds
not only to cover the operating costs of whatever charitable cause was identified by the founder but also
to pay the salary of the administrator (Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2012). Because awqaf were meant to last
in perpetuity, the funds used to support an individual waqf were often valuable assets that produced
annual profits such as the fruits of orchards, the crops of fields, or even surpluses from tax farming.
Endowing a waqf was therefore a pious deed but one only available to those with the substantial means
necessary for permanently alienating a tangible asset and its revenues.
15There is significant anecdotal evidence that in numerous contexts the waqf, particularly the waqf ahli (family waqf), which
named descendants of the founder as beneficiaries in perpetuity, was used as a vehicle for shielding wealth from redistribu-
tion mandated by inheritance laws (Crecelius, 1995; Mandaville, 1979).
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3.2 Usage of the waqf in Indonesia
The waqf institution reached Indonesia in the 1500s as Islam was taking deeper hold across the
archipelago. In sharp contrast with the Middle East, only a small fraction of land was held in waqf.
The Dutch colonial administration did not legally recognize awqaf for much of the time they ruled In-
donesia. In the late 18th century, this gradually changed as the influential colonial adviser Christiaan
Snouck Hurgronje introduced more liberal policies toward Islam (Atmadja, 1922; Benda, 1958; Salim,
2006). Nevertheless, these colonial restrictions limited the diffusion of the waqf in Indonesia relative to
the Middle East or South Asia (Abbasi, 2012; Bussons de Janssens, 1951). The creation of new awqaf gath-
ered pace during the 20th century, mostly in two separate phases: (i) during the 1930s, and (ii) during
the Sukarno regime that ruled after independence in 1945 (Djatnika, 1985).
While in Indonesia, as elsewhere, any charitable act can be endowed by a waqf, today, awqaf are pri-
marily used for supporting houses of worship or religious education. Indeed, most places of worship
and religious schools are endowed as waqf properties. However, because most economic entities, in-
cluding farmland, were not under waqf historically, the geographic coverage of awqaf (in terms of land
area) remains fairly limited (see Jahar, 2006). This distinguishes the institution from its more pervasive
application for economic purposes in some Muslim countries. At the same time, its widespread use in
Indonesia for important local religious institutions leaves open the possibility for outsized influence on
local culture and preferences via the enshrinement and emboldenment of such institutions.
4 Conceptual Framework: From Land Reform to Islamism
This section offers a conceptual framework that describes how an increase in waqf caused by the land
reform affected contemporary support for political Islam. While representing a small fraction of land in
Indonesia today,16 the waqf had a disproportionate long-run impact on politics for two reasons: (i) its
protection of elite interests at a critical juncture of history, and (ii) its support of other institutions that
are central to the organization of the Islamist movement, namely Islamic boarding schools (pesantren).
4.1 Land Reform and the Spread of Awqaf
By exempting awqaf lands from redistribution in the BAL, the Sukarno government united the interests
of large landowners and religious conservatives who were both threatened by the land reform. While
large landowners feared the confiscation of their property, Islamists feared a coup by forces sympathetic
to Communism within the regime and the marginalization of the class of rural landowners directly
responsible for funding religious institutions (Djatnika, 1985; Huizer, 1972; Utrecht, 1969). Not surpris-
ingly, landowners in affected districts took advantage of the loophole in the BAL to protect their land
by transferring it to waqf (often with antedated acts of transfer), increasing the institutionalized bonds
between rural elites and Islamists in districts most exposed to the land reform.
16Approximately 2,400 km2, or 0.12% of total land area was held in waqf in 2003, according to the village administrative census
known as Potensi Desa or Podes (see Section 5.2).
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The institutional characteristics of the waqf described in Section 3—its flexibility, immunity from ex-
propriation and the reputational benefits conferred on the founder—help explain why, when confronted
by the land reform, large landowners in threatened districts moved to protect their land by designating
it as waqf. In the most comprehensive study of this phenomenon, Djatnika (1985) documents that “many
Muslim landowners prefer[red] giving up their excess land in the form of wakaf [sic], rather than seeing
them attributed to the Peasant Front (BTI).” His analysis focuses on East Java, where 17 out of 28 districts
were above the 400 people/km2 threshold for expropriation. Figure 1 shows the variation in registered
waqf properties from the 1500s to the late 1900s in East Java, collected by and reproduced from Djatnika
(1985). The figure shows a surge in registered waqf properties in East Java during the Sukarno regime,
which peaked in the 1956–1960 period when the agrarian reform was announced. Awqaf registered dur-
ing this period totaled more than 120,000 hectares—a 165 % increase from the previous period.17
A large body of qualitative evidence supports the analysis from Djatnika (1985) and the general
finding that “Moslem religious institutions... frequently became the recipients of land from landlords
seeking to escape the application of the reform law” (Utrecht, 1969). Castles (1965) recounts a prominent
example in which elites transferred land under threat of expropriation to religious leaders:18
“For some years the school [Pondok-Moderen pesantren] has possessed 25 hectares of rice-field,
but this has recently been greatly increased by about 240 hectares, which was dedicated [to
waqf ] (diwakafkan) by landowners in the Ngawi district who were to lose it under the land
reform law. In late 1964 the communist peasant organization B.T.I, was trying to prevent the
Pondok-Moderen from getting any benefit from the land while the Pondok-Moderen was having
a struggle to hold on to it. But apparently it is legal to dedicate land in excess of the legal
maximum for religious purposes in this way.”
In our empirical analysis, we directly test whether the land reform induced waqf formation in areas
where landowners were most threatened with expropriation. Specifically, exploiting the fact that waqf
estates are inalienable, we show that districts where large landowners were most threatened by the 1960
land reform—districts with high population density and a large number of landowners with marginal
landholdings—have a higher density of waqf in the current period. This hypothesis is key to our theo-
retical argument: for the 1960 land reform to have affected Islamism in Indonesia today, it should have
induced variation in Islamic institutions that persisted over time.
4.2 Waqf and Elite Interests
Waqf lands protected under the land reform formalized customary notions about the inalienability of
land devoted to charity, and in doing so, cemented the position of rural elites. According to the leading
17Note that some of the dates of waqf creation in the 1956–1960 period likely reflect the antedating of land transfers during the
later period, a process alluded to in the quote by Utrecht (1969) in Section 2.3.
18This once-modest local pesantren has since blossomed into a center of Islamic education with a large network of schools
growing out of the original Islamic school at Guntur. Among its alumni are many influential Muslim leaders including
Hidayat Nur Wahid, an early leader of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS), one of the major Islamist
political parties over the last two decades. This example illustrates an important mechanism underlying our empirical results
that we flesh out in the remainder of this section, namely the link from the attempted land reform to waqf.
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scholar of the waqf in Indonesia, waqf estates enabled rural Indonesian elites to “endow public goods in
perpetuity and to benefit from the prestige and reputational benefits associated with this public demon-
stration of piety”, allowing “public recognition of their legacy to survive for decades, regardless of po-
litical power changes” (Fauzia, 2013).
While awqaf can be used to support secular public works (e.g., fountains, roads, wells), many
founders direct their waqf towards supporting explicitly religious institutions: mosques, prayer rooms,
Qur’anic schools (i.e., pesantren), and the like. This relationship has long been a feature of Islamic insti-
tutions in the Indonesian context, nicely illustrated in this passage from Hefner (2011):19
“Qur’anic schools across Indonesia have always depended on gifts from wealthy landowners
and on produce from lands controlled by the school owner. Endowments (waqf ) to religious
institutions are strongly sanctioned in Islamic law, linked as they are to the reproduction of
institutions at the heart of religious life. This circulation of wealth from economic to religious
elites (themselves sometimes from the ranks of the former) is all part of the way differences
of wealth and class are moralized in traditionalist Muslim communities.”
Consider the example of K.H. Choer Affandi (1923–1994), a member of the rural elite who established
the prominent Miftahul Huda pesantren in Tasikmalaya district around the time of the land reform. The
son of a Dutch police officer, Affandi belonged to the rural nobility as a descendant from the Sultan of
Mataram (Central Java, 1587–1755). Affandi became the leader of the Islamic State Movement (Darul
Islam) and fought as a guerrilla warrior in West Java between 1949–1962. After surrendering to the
government, he established the pesantren with the blessing of political elites, including the district mayor.
Before establishing the school, Affandi received “many [endowment] offers from several parties”:
“(1) Hadi Junaedi in Padayunga-Nagarawangi, who will donate 400 bricks of land, (2) K.
H. Ismal BA (member of the DPR [Local Legislature] Tasikmalaya and Chair of NU [Nahd-
latul Ulama, Islamic Organization]) who offers a house in the NU complex, (3) H. Badruddin
(Managing Director of Batik Partners and member of the PUI [Persatuan Umat Islam or Per-
sis, Islamic Organization) who will give 1 hectare of land along with 5 buildings in the City
of Tasikmalaya, (4) K. H. Kamaluddin, brother of Choer Affandi and head of a pesantren in
Pangandaran [District], who offers 1 hectare of waqf land . . . ” (Teguh, 2018).20
These historical accounts illustrate the reputational benefits of establishing a waqf for local economic
elites. Waqf lands created as a result of the land reform were often used to support other Islamic insti-
tutions that served the interests of these elites. As a result, we should observe a greater prevalence of
Islamic institutions typically supported by a waqf (such as mosques and pesantrens) in districts where
19Geertz (1956) similarly describes a common scene in the Javanese countryside where the economic and religious elites inter-
twine: “The rich hadji [an honorific title for those that undertook pilgrimage to Mecca], surrounded by a group of satellite
landholders and young laborer students, could build up a system of agricultural production (often with home industry at-
tached) which took the form of a kind of small-scale plantation.”
20As we describe below, Miftahul Huda pesantren became a stronghold of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pem-
bangunan or PPP), one of the longstanding Islamist parties in Indonesia. Affandi’s son, K.H. Asep Ahman Maoshul Affandi,
also became a Member of the National Legislature under the PPP banner.
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large landowners were most threatened by the 1960 land reform. Other forms of Islamic practice that
do not rely on the presence of a waqf should be unaffected by the land reform. We test this conjecture
by looking at the presence of zakat—a form of Islamic taxation or alms-giving that does not require the
presence of the waqf to function—-in districts targeted by the reform.
4.3 Pesantren and the Islamist Movement
Pesantren have long played an important role in shaping political Islam in Indonesia (Buehler, 2016; Lee,
2004; Turmudi, 2006). Sukmajati (2011) provides a detailed qualitative study of this relationship in Tasik-
malaya District (noted above), which has among the highest prevalence of pesantren in the country and
the highest levels of electoral support for Islamist parties. Among these pesantren is the abovementioned
Miftahul Huda, which “appl[ies] Salafism” and “focuses heavily on Islamic studies . . . . The local popu-
lation also assumes that the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school is close to the United Development
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP)” (Sukmajati, 2011). In the 1999 election, which we study in
the empirical section of this paper, Tasikmalaya reliably voted for the Islamist PPP, which came on top
of the vote in 41% of the district’s villages (compared to the national average of 10%).21
The connection between pesantren and political Islam can take many forms. For example, students in
these institutions often form the next generation of Islamist political leaders (see footnote 18). Pesantren
students often retain their social networks when entering university, where Islamic groups played a cen-
tral role in sustaining Islamist organizational capital amidst the repression during the Suharto era (see
Machmudi, 2008). Pesantren also engage in public goods provision and other community-based activism
that would likely influence those outside the immediate family networks in these schools. Hamayotsu
(2011), for example, details the vital role of Islamic schools and related community-building efforts in
mobilizing and growing support for the hardline Prosperous Justice Party. Finally, pesantren often main-
tain their own militias, which are used for agitation and mobilization around elections (Buehler, 2016).
Our last set of hypotheses thus pertain to the final link in the pathway from the 1960 land reform and
local support for Islamism in Indonesia. If districts at greater risk for land reform experienced a surge in
the prevalence of organizations that support political Islam, such as pesantren, then these districts should
display greater support for Islamic parties, candidates, and policies in the contemporary era.
5 Empirical Framework
This section describes our main testable hypotheses, data sources, and the identification strategy we use
to estimate the long-term effect of the 1960 land reform on Islamic institutions endowed in waqf as well
as contemporary support for political Islam.
21The PPP was the umbrella Islamic party founded in the early 1970s when the Suharto regime forced all Islamic parties (of
which there were five in the first legislative election in 1971) into a single ticket. This grouping of diverse parties survived
until the mid-1980s when it split along ideological and regional lines, eventually giving birth to a more moderate Islamic
party (PKB). We consider these various distinctions across religious parties when presenting empirical results.
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5.1 Key Predictions
Several testable implications follow from the qualitative evidence presented in Section 4. First, we should
see differences in waqf prevalence between districts most threatened by the land reform and districts
exposed to less redistribution under the reform. Specifically, there should be higher concentrations of
waqf in districts above the 400 people/km2 threshold and a large number of large landholdings. Second,
we should observe a higher concentration of pesantren endowed and supported by these awqaf in those
districts. Third, we should find greater electoral support for the Islamist movement in areas with a
higher prevalence of waqf -endowed peasantren established after the 1960 land reform. We describe next
the data and identification strategy used to test these hypotheses.
5.2 Data: Measuring Land Reform Exposure, Islamic Institutions, and Islamism
We use a variety of geographic, demographic, socioeconomic, and electoral data to estimate the effect
of the aborted 1960 land reform on the prevalence of Islamic institutions and contemporary support for
Islamist parties. We report summary statistics in Appendix Table A.1 and provide complete details on
data sources and variable construction in Appendix B.
Land and Demographic Data. Our analysis relies on two historic district-level variables that deter-
mined the intensity of expropriation under the land reform: 1960 population density and the presence
of large landholdings. Since we do not observe the measure of population density used by the gov-
ernment during the design of the land reform, we reconstructed district-level population density using
population figures from the 1961 Population Census, and land area figures calculated in ArcGIS, based
on the historic district boundaries. There are 202 historic districts in the 1960 Census records, and 200
districts in the 1963 Agricultural Census. After linking with other data sources, detailed below, we are
left with 188 historic districts, which are the level at which the policy shocks vary and hence our main
source of identifying variation. Our resulting measure of district-level population density averages 275
people/km2 across all of Indonesia, and 555 people/km2 in Java. The threshold of 400 people/km2,
which we focus on in our baseline analysis, is approximately the 70th percentile in population density.
To capture differences in the presence of large landholdings, we use district-level figures on the dis-
tribution of landholdings from the 1963 Agricultural Census. The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS)
used this Census to evaluate the land tenure situation ahead of the actual implementation of the land
reform (Huizer, 1972). The Census provides, at the district level, the number of landholdings falling in
seven discrete bins under 5 hectares, as well as the total number of holdings above 5 hectares. We esti-
mate the number of holdings marginally affected by the population density cutoffs used in the reform.
Under the reform, holdings affected by the 400 people/km2 cutoff, for example, were those ranging
between 5 and 9 hectares (5–7.5 hectares for irrigated land, and 6–9 hectares for dry land). Any hold-
ings above 9 hectares would have been confiscated at the next lowest threshold of population density
of 250 people/km2.22 Our identification strategy, detailed in Section 5.3 below, therefore leverages both
22Ideally, we would have data on the distribution of landholdings before the announcement of land reform aims in 1959. While
such data is not available, the Pareto estimating procedure will capture the leading sources of cross-sectional variation in large
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discontinuous variation in the intensity of the reform above and below the 400 people/km2 cutoff, and
cross-sectional variation in the number of “marginal” landholdings subject to redistribution.
However, because the number of marginal holdings in ranges above 5 ha is unobserved in the 1963
Agricultural Census, we must draw upon estimation methods popularized in recent work on upper tail
income and wealth. In the manner of Piketty and Saez (2003) and Saez and Zucman (2016), among others,
we estimate the size of these bins by assuming a Pareto distribution over landholdings and estimating
the shape parameter separately for each district (see Appendix B.2 for full details). There is growing
consensus that the Pareto distribution appropriately describes the distribution of landholdings (e.g., see
Allen (2014) and Bazzi (2017) for evidence from the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively). We use
this methodology to calculate the number of large landholdings targeted by the reform in each district,
depending on its population density category.
Islamic Institutions and Organizations. Our data on Islamic institutions, including the amount and
fraction of land under waqf, comes from the 2003 Village Potential Statistics (Podes) Survey, which is avail-
able at the village-level for approximately 69,000 villages across Indonesia.23 The amount of land held
in waqf is small relative to total land. This is consistent with the fact that awqaf typically do not support
large agricultural estates in Indonesia, but rather mosques, prayer rooms, and educational institutions.
In 2003, 66% of villages have some land under waqf, and the average village has 1.9 hectares of waqf, with
waqf parcels covering 0.5% of total land and 5.9% of legally zoned land. From Podes, we also use data on
the number of pesantren, mosques, and zakat groups. We use the 2000 Population Census to measure the
Muslim population share in each village.
Electoral Support for Islamist Parties. We use two main data sources to measure electoral outcomes.
First, we use the 2003 Podes, which records village-level information on the 1999 national legislative
election, the first election in the post-Suharto, democratic era. This election was won by the Indone-
sian Democratic Party (PDI-P, centre-left and nationalist) with 33.7% of the vote. Our primary focus is
on the performance of Islamic and Islamist parties. The National Awakening Party (PKB, Islamic mod-
erate) won 12.6% of the vote, and the United Development Party (PPP, Islamist) won 10.7%.24 Other
Islamist parties like the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Islamist) garnered smaller vote shares but fig-
ure importantly in understanding Islamist politics in subsequent elections. The Podes data reveal which
party finished first, second, and third in each village but do not indicate the vote shares. This is the only
available dataset that allows us to observe voting outcomes below the district level in the 1999 election.
holdings so long as there is not significant misreporting at the cutoffs. We find no indication of pervasive bunching below the
5 hectare threshold in affected districts. We assess this directly by checking for a violation of the monotonicity implication
of the power law distribution for landholdings, which implies that the number of landholders with farms of 3–3.99 hectares
should exceed the number of landholders with farms of 4–4.99 hectares. Violations of this pattern could point to misreporting
of holdings above 5 hectares as just below 5 hectares to avoid expropriation in districts with population density above 400
people/km2. We see 4 out of 58 districts above the 400 cutoff with more landholdings in 4–4.99 ha than in 3–3.99 ha. This
suggests that the bunching is limited, if indeed it exists. Moreover, results are robust to omitting these four districts.
23We restrict attention to around 55,000 villages covered by the scope of the land reform and with data that can be linked to the
historic districts from the 1963 Agricultural Census.
24The PKB emerged after the fall of Suharto as an alternative to the longstanding PPP and as a vehicle for organizing votes
among those long affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama movement originating in East Java. This group had largely split with
the PPP umbrella of Islamic parties in the 1980s as a result of ideological disagreement (see footnote 21).
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Second, we draw upon district-level vote shares, which allow us to track voting behavior over the
entire study period beginning in 1955 with the first legislative election after independence.25 These data
cover elections through 2009 and provide a more complete picture of voting patterns in the democratic
era but come at the expense of the geographic detail in Podes. For both the historical and post-Suharto
period, we categorize Islamic and Islamist parties using well-established classifications in the political
science literature (Baswedan, 2004) (see Section 6.3 and Appendix B.5 for details on the classification).
Voter Preferences. We use individual-level data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (2007 and
2014/15) to measure voters’ preferences for politicians’ religious leanings. We focus in particular on
respondents’ stated preferences revealed by two survey questions capturing how important candidates
religion and religiosity are in influencing their voting decisions.
Sharia Regulations. Buehler (2016) provides data on the number of sharia regulations adopted by dis-
trict governments from 1998–2013. In total, his dataset includes 443 regulations adopted across 133 dis-
tricts. We use all three variables provided in this dataset, namely (i) the number of regulations (adopted
by local legislatures), (ii) the number of executive instructions and decrees (adopted by local mayors,
known as bupati), and (iii) the total number of regulations, all of which are reported at the district level.
These regulations cover myriad issues including, among others, the payment of zakat tax to the closing
of commercial establishments during Friday prayer to the wearing of the Islamic headscarf by women.
Other Outcomes. The aborted land reform could have affected a range of socioeconomic outcomes
correlated with Islamist institutions and politics through channels other than the waqf. We address these
potential channels by also looking at measures of development and public goods (see Section 6.6).
5.3 Identification
To evaluate the intensity of the anticipated land reform, we use the differences-in-discontinuity design
described and formalized in Grembi et al. (2016). As in a standard RD design, this specification exploits
discontinuous policy variation at the cutoff used to determine the intensity of expropriation.
Note, however, that the reform used three different cutoffs at 50, 250, and 400 people/km2, as dis-
cussed above. Unfortunately, we do not have enough power to estimate separate discontinuities at each
cutoff since our variation comes at the level of 1963 districts, of which there are 188 in our data.26 As
a baseline, for the RD component of the research design, we focus on the maximum threshold of 400
people/km2. We do this for two reasons. First, this was the only relevant threshold on the island of
Java, which was the main target for mass redistribution under the BAL, and where only 7 districts (out
of 81) had a density under 250 people/km2. Indeed, knowledge and implementation of the reform was
25Several districts are missing data for the 1955 elections. We therefore supplement the 1955 national legislative election data
with data from the 1957 district legislative elections that were held in select districts. We digitize the latter from raw electoral
report files shared with us by Donald Hindley. There are still some historic districts outside Java and Bali with no voting data
from the 1950s, and for these 20 districts, we impute the vote shares for neighboring districts so as to retain the largest possible
sample of districts when including this potentially important control. See Appendix B.5 for full details on the electoral data.
26There are 58 historic districts in the > 400 people/km2 category, 27 districts with 251–400, 42 with 51–250, and 61 with ≤50.
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much weaker outside Java (see Huizer, 1972). Second, this is one of only two thresholds that allows a
clean comparison between districts with a higher reform intensity (all districts above 400 people/km2)
and districts with a lower reform intensity (districts below 400 people/km2). Districts between 251–400
people/km2 can be considered both “treated” with respect to the 250 cutoff and “untreated” with respect
to the 400 cutoff. For robustness, we additionally consider the other such threshold at 50 people/km2.
In particular, we pool two separate RD specifications at the 50 and 400 cutoffs, restricting the former to
the districts with density above and below 50 but less than 250 and restricting the latter to districts with
density above and below 400 but greater than 250 (see Section 6.7). This specification is richer but also
subject to greater noise given that reform efforts around the 50 cutoff were more limited.
To identify areas most threatened by the reform, we introduce the difference-in-discontinuity based
on districts with a large number of wetland holdings between 5–7.5 hectares and of dryland holdings
between 6–9 hectares. These are the marginal landholdings at the 400 people/km2 threshold since hold-
ings above 7.5 hectares of irrigated land and above 9 hectares of dry land would also be confiscated in
districts above 250 people/km2. The areas we define as most affected by the land reform are therefore the
districts with a density above 400 people/km2, and a large number of holdings between 5–7.5 hectares
of wetland and 6–9 hectares of dryland. In other words, the difference on top of the discontinuity helps
to identify areas where the land reform was likely to bind; districts above 400 people/km2 would have
limited exposure to redistribution if there are few large landholders.
We estimate variants of the following equation:
yij = α+ γAbove400j + δLHj + βAbove400j × LHj
+ g(Dj)
′η1 + (g(Dj)×Above400j)′ η2 + (g(Dj)× LHj)′ η3 + X′ijΩ + εij , (1)
where i denotes village and j denotes 1960 district; Above400j is a dummy variable for districts above
400 people/km2; LHj is a dummy variable for districts above the sample median in the number of
large expropriable landholdings at the onset of the land reform;27 g(Dj) is a polynomial in population
density estimated separately on either side of the 400 people/km2 cutoff, and interacted with LHj . We
use a third-order polynomial as a baseline but consider other values for robustness. Xij is a vector of
controls also interacted with Above400j and LHj . In addition to six island fixed effects, these controls,
discussed in Section 6, are either measured at baseline (prior to the land reform) or are time-invariant.
Our baseline specification includes all districts, and in robustness checks in Section 6.7, we vary the
bandwidth around the 400 cutoff. We cluster standard errors by 1960 district, the level of variation of the
land reform, and inference is robust to the Young (2016) effective degrees of freedom adjustment, which
is reassuring given the relatively small sample.28
The main coefficient of interest in equation (1) is β, the coefficient on the interaction ofAbove400j with
27The binary definition eases interpretation, but for robustness, we also consider a continuous measure of the number of large
landholdings (see Section 6.7).
28The Young (2016) adjustment accounts for the potentially more limited empirical variation across districts than implied by
their unique values. This approach routinely delivers very similar inference as clustering by 1960 district, and hence we
maintain the latter throughout. The Young (2016) procedure also suggests that we have around 20 effective degrees of freedom
to identify β in regressions with the full set of controls.
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LHj . This coefficient captures differential effects of the reform by comparing districts with more versus
less large landholdings among those exposed to greater expropriation under the land reform. Above400j
and Dj are the equivalent of the treatment dummy and the running variable in a standard regression
discontinuity (RD) framework, while LHj plays the role of the interacted variable in a difference-in-
differences (DID) setup.
Illustration of Identification Strategy. Before turning to results, we illustrate in Figure 2 the intuition
behind our identification strategy. The figure plots the prevalence of awqaf as a fraction of zoned land
at the level of historical districts, above and below the 400 people/km2 and for two groups of districts:
districts with a large number of marginal landholdings (in blue) and with a small number of marginal
landholdings (in red). We highlight four districts to illustrate the discontinuous change in outcomes
between both groups of districts at the cutoff. On the left side of the cutoff, Sampang and Malang have
historical population densities of 395.8 and 399.3 people/km2, respectively. Sampang has a relatively low
number of estimated marginal landholdings (57), and Malang has a high number (300). Awqaf represent
1.95% and 3.79% of zoned land in Sampang and Malang (300), respectively. On the right side, two
districts close to the cutoff are Klungkung (413.9 people/km2) and Bogor (415 people/km2). Klungkung
has a low number of marginal landholdings (21), and Bogor has a high number (228). The gap in awqaf
as a fraction of zoned land on this side of the cutoff is 2.3% (Klungkung) versus 9.2% (Bogor). Our
specification in equation (1) captures the difference in differences (i.e., (9.2-2.3) - (3.79-1.95)) at the 400
people/km2 cutoff, controlling flexibly for population density as in a standard RD specification.
Figure 2 also illustrates why we do not use a simple RD around the 400 people/km2 cutoff to estimate
the long-term effects of the BAL. There is no discontinuous jump in this variable when looking across
the entire sample. This particular feature of the data is consistent with the fact that the 400 people/km2
cutoff was only relevant for landowners with expropriable holdings. For other landowners (i.e, those
with holdings under 5 ha or above 9 ha), the intensity of expropriation was orthogonal to population
density in the district. In other words, these landowners should not have perceived a differential (higher)
threat of expropriation at this particular cutoff.
Yet, districts without a large number of marginal holdings provide a useful comparison group for our
analysis. By definition, these districts also had a larger landed elite prior to the reform.29 Our argument is
that the long-term effects of the reform materialized from the targeting of this particular group. The BAL
cemented the position of existing elites by providing them with an incentive to collude with religious
leaders. Thus, by design, our estimation framework does not simply capture a discontinuous jump in
the threat of expropriation at the 400 people/km2 cutoff. Rather, it identifies the differential effects of
this threat faced by two groups of districts: those with and without a large landed elite pre-reform.
Identification Checks. To provide a valid causal estimate of the effect of the land reform, this design
requires the main identifying assumptions of both RD and DID to hold: namely, (i) potential outcomes
must be continuous at the 400 people/km2 threshold, and (ii) the parallel trends assumptions must be
satisfied for districts above and below the median in large landholdings.
29Among districts on the right-hand side of the 400 people/km2 cutoff, 5 have 0 marginal landholdings and 30 have less than
100 marginal landholdings.
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On (i), in Appendix Table A.2, we regress baseline covariates on a standard RD specification testing
for discontinuities at the 400 people/km2 cutoff (with a third-order polynomial in the running variable,
population density, estimated separately on each side of the cutoff). These are the same variables we use
as controls in equation (1), as discussed in Section 6.1. We also regress these covariates on our differences-
in-discontinuity (RDID) specification. Out of 32 coefficients in this table, 5 are significant at conventional
levels—4 in the standard RD specification, and 1 in our baseline RDID specification. Importantly, we find
small null effects of the RD and RDID terms on the vote share for Islamic parties in the 1955/57 elections,
which is reassuring since any pre-trends in terms of support for Islamist movements would likely have
been captured by this variable. Nevertheless, since the number of significant coefficients in Appendix
Table A.2 is slightly more than what we would expect to find as a result of chance, throughout the
analysis we show that our main results are robust to including this entire set of controls, appropriately
interacted with the RDID terms. In Appendix Figure A.1, we also implement a McCrary (2008) test of
manipulation of the running variable, population density. We find no evidence of such manipulation. On
(ii), we show that the significant effects of the land reform (β) on the prevalence of waqf disappear when
using a placebo cutoff of 300 or 500 people/km2 instead of the actual cutoff of 400 people/km2. Together,
these results and other robustness checks below bolster the causal interpretation of our findings.
6 Empirical Results: Long-Run Effects of the Land Reform
This section presents our core empirical results linking land reform exposure to waqf prevalence, related
Islamic institutions, and Islamist politics and policies. We consider alternative explanations and present
a battery of robustness checks before concluding.
6.1 Effects on Waqf
Table 1 reports our estimates of the effect of the aborted land reform on contemporary waqf presence,
measured in 2003. We look at hectares (cols. 1-2) and log hectares (cols. 3-4) of waqf, as well as the
fraction of total land (cols. 5-6) and zoned land (cols. 7-8) under waqf.
In addition to the coefficients reported in this table, all specifications include a 3rd order polyno-
mial in 1960 population density interacted (i) a dummy for districts above the 400 people/km2 and (ii) a
dummy for districts above the sample median in large landholdings. Odd-numbered columns report es-
timates without controls, while even-numbered columns include a set of predetermined controls. These
controls include island fixed effects as well as a vector of pre-land reform characteristics (Xij), including
the total male and female populations, the total amount of farms, irrigated land, and agricultural land
(all measured in the early 1960s at the district-level). We also include in Xij time-invariant geographic
controls—altitude, distance to the nearest district and subdistrict capital, and whether the village is lo-
cated on a hill or on the coast—as well as the vote share received by Islamic parties in the 1955 and
1957 elections. These were the last elections conducted before the land reform, and the last free and fair
elections conducted until 1999. These controls help ensure that the long-run effects of the land reform
that we identify are not confounded by underlying political preferences that predate the reform. We
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further interact the controls in Xij with Above400j and LHj . Reassuringly, though, our key findings are
generally not sensitive to the inclusion of these controls.
Across most specifications in Table 1, we find that villages in districts heavily targeted by the land
reform—districts with high population density and large landholdings—have significantly more land
under waqf in 2003, whether land is measured in hectares or as a fraction of land. In columns 5-6, we find
that the fraction of total land under waqf is 0.6–1.1 percentage points higher in districts targeted by the
reform. Consistent with the historical accounts discussed above, we interpret these estimates as evidence
that in anticipation of the land reform, big landowners sought to protect their land from expropriation
by placing it under waqf. The inalienable nature of the waqf meant that even when redistributed lands
were eventually reclaimed by their original owners in the late 1960s, lands designated awqaf could not
be reclaimed.30 These waqf estates persisted to the modern period.
6.2 Effects on Islamic Boarding Schools (Pesantren)
In Table 2, we test the hypothesis that the land reform also led to an increase in the prevalence of other
Islamic organizations. In columns 1-2 and 3-4, we show that villages in districts targeted by the reform
have more Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) and more mosques in 2003. Districts most exposed to the
reform have around 1.5 more pesantren relative to the mean of 0.5 and 6 more mosques relative to the
mean of 3.1. This effect does not hold for another type of Islamic organization that does not require the
existence of a waqf, i.e. zakat organizations (cols. 5-6). The intensity of the land reform also does not lead
to a greater Muslim share of the population in 2000 (cols. 7-8).
Overall, Table 2 provides evidence that the land reform increased the prevalence of Islamic organiza-
tions typically held in waqf (pesantren and mosques), but had no effect on the general practice of Islam or
the presence of other types of Islamic organizations. With this deeper reach of Islamic institutions comes
stronger support for Islamist politics.
6.3 Effects on Electoral Support for Islamism
We show in Table 3 that districts targeted by the 1960 land reform provide greater subsequent electoral
support for Islamist parties in the first democratic election of 1999. Columns 1–4 examine outcomes
for the two moderate Islamic parties with no interest in pushing for an Islamic state or sharia law. The
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) or PAN and the National Awakening Party (Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa) or PKB both initially adopted the national pluralistic ideology of Pancasila prior to
the 1999 election, when parties could for the first time choose whether or not to embrace this ideology.31
Conversely, columns 5-10 of Table 3 examine outcomes for three hardline Islamist parties that ad-
vocate for a central role of Islam in government: the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pem-
30We further validate these findings by exploiting additional variation induced by the BAL, which, recall from Section 2.2,
stipulated that no individual could hold more than 20 hectares of land. Using the estimated number holdings implied by
the Pareto distribution for each district, we find a strong positive correlation between the number of holdings above 20 ha in
early 1960 and the prevalence of awqaf land in 2003.
31These two parties are closely affiliated with the two largest and longstanding Muslim non-governmental organizations in
Indonesia (Muhammidiyah for PAN and Nahdlatul Ulama for PKB).
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bangunan) or PPP, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) or PKS, and the Moon and Star
Party (Partai Bulan Bintang) or PBB. All three parties advocated for Islamic law and rejected Pancasila,
including the PPP which was forced to accept Pancasila when it was the only Islamic party allowed to
run during the authoritarian Suharto era. In all columns, the dependent variable is a dummy variable
indicating whether the given party was among the top 3 parties in the village in the 1999 election.32
Looking across columns of Table 3, we find robust evidence that the land reform increased long-term
electoral support for Islamist parties at the expense of more moderate parties, Islamist or otherwise. This
is seen most clearly in comparing the large positive effects of land reform intensity on the likelihood of
a top 3 finish for the PPP (cols. 5–6) relative to the large negative effects on the likelihood of a top 3
finish for the PKB (cols. 3–4). This difference is telling as the PKB is the successor to a political bloc
that disbanded from the PPP in 1984 on account of ideological differences over the role of conservative
ideology in the party’s future. The effect on the smaller Islamist parties is more limited, though PKS, a
new party in the post-Suharto era, would prove an important player over subsequent elections especially
as the PPP moderated part of its Islamist platform.
Islamist Party Performance in the Democratic Era. The 1999 election was especially important since it
was the first of the democratic era and hence offered an early indication of underlying preferences long
dormant in the Suharto era of political repression. However, being the first election, it was also subject
to uncertainty and limited information about the nature and credibility of party platforms. In this period
of abrupt political change, it is possible that party fortunes would have changed in subsequent elections
as parties matured and a realignment of policies and preferences took hold.
In Table 4, we investigate whether the effects of land reform intensity on electoral outcomes changed
over time.33 We do so using data on electoral outcomes at the district level, which allows us to identify
the effects on vote shares. We follow the grouping from Table 3, putting together the vote shares for the
moderate Islamic parties and the hardline Islamist parties. Looking across columns 1–4, the results line
up closely with the village-level party rankings. Turning to columns 5–8, we see that even a decade after
the first democratic election, Islamist parties continue to significantly outperform non-Islamist, moderate
Islamic parties in districts most heavily exposed to the attempted land reform in the early 1960s.34 This
outperformance is consistent with qualitative work by Hamayotsu (2011), who argues that increasing
support for PKS over the first few democratic elections is likely to have come at the expense of support
for PKB, which increasingly finds itself in competition locally with PKS-influenced pesantren and other
Islamic schools.
Overall, these results suggest that an important legacy of the land reform was to shift the population
of those voting for Islamic parties towards more hardline Islamist parties. This initially took the form
of support for the PPP and over time expanded to include the new PKS. The sustained support for
32Looking at first and second place parties delivers similar, albeit noisier results given the more limited variation.
33We also investigate voting for Islamic parties during the authoritarian, Suharto era and find some evidence, albeit weak, of
differential support for Islamist parties in areas most affected by the attempted land reform. However, these results are not
easy to interpret given that elections were not free and fair, and the Suharto regime severely limited the ability of Islamist
movements to organize politically.
34We find similar patterns for the election in 2004.
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Islamist parties (within the set of Islamic parties) may be due in part to the important role of mobilization
through various social networks affiliated with pesantren and specific mosques. This is a recurring theme
in the rich qualitative literature on religious politics in Indonesia (see, among others, Buehler, 2016;
Hamayotsu, 2011; Hilmy, 2010; Permata, 2008; Sukmajati, 2011). Buehler (2016) in particular provides
a deep and compelling look at the role of Islamist activists in shaping local politics through the lens of
efforts to implement sharia-inspired laws, an outcome we turn to below.
6.4 Effects on Policy: Voter Preferences, Sharia Regulations, and Local Governance
The long-run effects of the land reform on electoral outcomes are suggestive of effects on voter pref-
erences. In Table 5, we provide direct evidence on voter preferences in line with Islamists’ success at
the polls. We measure these preferences using the questions from the IFLS on the importance of a can-
didate’s religion and religiosity in influencing voting decisions. We report estimates from equation (1)
using two different variables from the IFLS as the dependent variable: whether respondents say a candi-
date’s religion makes it very likely to vote for him/her (cols. 1-2), and whether a candidate’s religiosity
makes it very likely to vote for him/her (cols. 3-4). We find large and significant effects on both of these
variables. In addition to supporting Islamist parties, voters in districts targeted by the land reform are
more likely to support religious candidates, even if such candidates don’t necessarily run on Islamist
party tickets. This is an important finding, as previous research identifying an Islamist “advantage” in
Indonesia relies on party and not individual characteristics (Pepinsky et al., 2012).
If the individual characteristics and preferences of candidates translate into different policy choices
(a key prediction of citizen-candidate models; see Besley and Coate, 1997; Chattopadhyay and Duflo,
2004; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996), then these effects of the land reform should also have an impact on
local government policy. We test for this in Table 6, which investigate effects of the land reform on the
adoption of sharia law at the district level between 1998-2013. This policy outcome is particularly relevant
in the Indonesian context after the introduction of democracy in 1998 and decentralization in 2000. We
look at the adoption of any regulations in columns 1–2, the log number of regulations adopted by district
executives (mayors) in columns 3–4, and the log number of regulations adopted by district legislature
in columns 5–6, and the log total number of regulations in columns 7–8. Importantly, many of these
regulations were not adopted by Islamist parties, but by local governments and assemblies controlled
by secular parties (Buehler, 2016). Hence, these measures reflect the political influence of the Islamist
movement beyond that reflected solely in their vote share.
We find sizable positive long-term effects of land reform intensity on sharia regulations adopted since
1998. The estimates are somewhat imprecise but significant at the 10 percent level in most specifications.
While these results must be interpreted with caution, they tell a story consistent with the estimates re-
ported in Tables 1–4. Districts targeted for expropriation under the Basic Agrarian Law exhibit higher
concentrations of waqf and pesantren in the contemporary period, and they provide greater support for
Islamist parties and religious candidates that translate into a consequential policy outcome—the adop-
tion of more pervasive sharia laws. This result is particularly significant in the context of Indonesia,
since the struggle between advocates and opponents of sharia law has divided the Indonesian political
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spectrum since the dawn of independence (Lee, 2004).
Looking beyond sharia law, it is also plausible that the increased role of the Islamist movement at
the local level fosters competition between the state and civil society. In Table 7, we provide indirect
evidence consistent with this possibility by examining the effects of the land reform on the composition
of village-level government revenue. We show that villages in districts with greater exposure to the land
reform are less likely to draw on public land (col. 1) as a source of revenue and more likely to draw
on revenue from informal social or community organizations (cols. 2-3). These village governments in
exposed districts are also slightly more likely to draw a larger share of revenue from private sources
such as individuals and firms (col. 4). While the latter estimate is imprecise, the pattern is clear: local
government tends to be much more tightly connected with private social revenue streams than with
public revenue streams in areas differentially affected by the land reform. What’s more, these social
revenue streams are highly correlated with the prevalence of awqaf and pesantren.35 Together, these
patterns provide further evidence of the link between the initial land reform, the strength of Islamist-
leaning organizations, and broader policy ramifications.
6.5 Summary: Land Reform and the Islamization of Politics
Our findings thus far suggest that the land reform of 1960 led exposed regions to embrace a deeper role
for Islam in political life as seen through electoral outcomes, voter preferences, and policy implementa-
tion. Although Islamist parties do not dominate elections, they can exert significant impacts on politics
across the administrative hierarchy. By commanding significant and in some cases pivotal voting blocs,
these parties are able to influence the direction of policy. We saw this at the local level where many
districts have implemented sharia laws even when local legislatures and mayorships are not controlled
by Islamist parties. This can also potentially arise at the national level where newly elected presiden-
cies, led by secular parties, have typically appointed at least one if not more members of Islamist parties
to cabinet-level positions where they have considerable scope for affecting the political orientation of
certain ministries or aspects of governance.36
6.6 Alternative Explanations
We argued above that the link between exposure to land redistribution in the 1960s and political Islam
today is shaped by the transfer of land wealth from local elites to religious institutions via the waqf.
With available sources of identification, it is not possible to definitively isolate this particular channel of
mediation above all others. However, we are able to rule out several alternative explanations for this link
that do not necessarily run through awqaf -endowed institutions prone to political capture. We present
35Regressing the share of land under waqf status on the four revenue share variables (and our baseline controls) suggests a
strong negative correlation with the public land share and a strong positive correlation with the social organization shares.
The same holds with even greater precision when looking at the number of pesantren as the dependent variable.
36Some examples of this include (i) the ascendence of PPP Chairman Hamzah Haz to the vice presidency in 2001, (ii) the
awarding of several cabinet positions to PPP leaders in the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono elected president in
2004, and (iii) the election of PKS leader Hidayat Our Wahid to the Speaker of Parliament after the party’s strong performance
in the 2004 legislative election.
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these results here.
Residual Land Inequality. One concern is that the land reform affected the land distribution in targeted
districts. This would be a concern for our theoretical argument if land inequality increases support for Is-
lamism. In columns 1-3 of Table 8, we test whether reform intensity affects the change in land inequality
between 1963 and 1980, 1985, and 1990 using district-level estimates of the Pareto dispersion parameter
(λ) from large-scale population census and survey data. The results suggest limited systematic effects
of the land reform on inequality in the countryside in the first few decades after the reform. Column
1 of Table 9, estimated at the village-level in 2003, paints a similar picture. Together, these null results
are consistent with the studies mentioned in Section 2.3 arguing that the land redistribution efforts were
largely undone by the early 1970s.
Demographic Changes from the 1965–66 Mass Violence. Another, potentially significant challenge to
our interpretation is that the widespread massacre of purported Communists closely followed the land
reform. While the data limitations concerning this episode of potential genocide are well known (Cribb,
1990), we address this issue in columns 4–5 of Table 8, where we test for effects of the land reform on two
measures of demographic changes after the mass murders: population growth between 1961–71 (col. 4),
and changes in male-to-female sex ratios between 1961 and 1971 (col. 5). The latter is a useful check as
men were the primary targets of the mass murders.
We find little evidence that reform intensity predicts significantly slower overall population growth
or differential growth of men versus women.37 This has two implications for our main results. First,
the effects we find on contemporary support for Islamism are not likely to be explained by changes
in the underlying voting population. Second, even if Islamist groups organized around pesantren con-
tributed to the mass violence in 1965-66 (Fealy and McGregor, 2010; van Bruinessen, 2004), the locations
targeted for expropriation—and where the alliance between rural elites and Islamist groups was eventu-
ally solidified—may not have been where the mass killings disproportionately took place. Overall, these
results provide further support to the particular channels we highlight in Section 4: the land reform con-
tributed to contemporary support for Islamism through its effect on specific Islamic institutions, namely
waqf, pesantren, and mosques.
Economic Development and Public Goods. While there is considerable debate about the long-run con-
sequences of the waqf for economic development, there is a strong argument that the waqf ’s inflexibility
made it increasingly inefficient, especially after the introduction of the corporation. This perspective
argues that the perpetual alienation of property inevitably becomes inefficient as modes of production
and technologies change. Because the terms of the waqf cannot be changed, the waqf “locks” land to
inefficient modes of production and unlike a corporation, cannot be easily dissolved when it is no longer
viable (Kuran, 2001, 2011). In this account, the uptake of waqf in response to the land reform contributed
37These null findings are in line with a consensus view among demographers of Indonesia that there is little evidence of missing
people in Population Censuses conducted after the violence during the 1960s. We confirmed this view in several lengthy email
discussions in 2013 with Terrence Hull and Peter McDonald, leading demographers with decades of experience working on
the Population Census in Indonesia.
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to Islamist dominance in affected districts because these districts became systematically less developed
than those where there was no increase in the waqf and more flexible institutions were adopted.
In Table 9, we do not find significant evidence for this adverse economic effect of the land reform.
Column 1 reports the abovementioned null effect on the long-run village-level distribution of land, prox-
ied by λ, as measured in the same year and enumeration cycle as the Podes data from which we observe
waqf land. We then examine several proxies for local development: the extent of irrigation in 2003 (col.
2), an index of public goods provided by the village such as local garbage collection in 2003 (col. 3), a
weighted index of agricultural productivity across all crops in 2003 (col. 4), rice productivity in 2003
(col. 5), the share of the village with any nighttime light intensity in 2000 (col. 6), average household
expenditures per capita averaged across available rounds of the Susenas household survey from 1994
to 2010 (col. 7), an indicator for whether the village has a high school in 2003 (col. 8); and the share
of households with any post-primary education in 2000 Population Census (col. 9). Across seven out
of eight columns, we find insignificant effects of the land reform intensity on local development.38 It
is of course possible that the land reform affected other aspects of development and local public goods
that we do not observe. Yet, these largely null results suggest that the legacy of the land reform for
Islamist prevalence today is likely to operate through an institutional channel by which the waqf (and
affected establishments) helped solidify a prominent role in local society for Islamic leaders and their
constituents.
6.7 Further Robustness Checks
Before concluding, we discuss several additional robustness checks on the core outcomes in Tables 1–3.
The results, reported in Appendix A.3, are as follows. First, we show in A.3.1 that our main results are
mostly robust to an alternative parametrization of the RD where we pool the 50 and 400 people/km2 cut-
offs following the approach described in Section 5.3.39 Second, we show in A.3.2 that our results are not
sensitive to the definition of large landholdings as a continuous measure rather than our baseline choice
of splitting the sample between above and below the median. Third, A.3.3 demonstrates for those same
core outcomes that our results are not driven solely by the fully specified difference-in-discontinuity
(diff-in-disc) specification but mostly arise for even simpler difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) specifi-
cations that omit the g(Dj) terms in equation (1).
We further probe the RD component of the diff-in-disc. Appendix A.3.4 shows that the results mostly
38The positive and significant effect in column 8 may be an artifact of the different sample due to the fact that many villages
were not covered by the survey.
39In this alternative specification, the density ranges 51-250 people/km2 and over 400 people/km2 are considered treated, and
the density ranges under 50 people/km2 and between 251-400 people/km2 are considered untreated. Marginal holdings at
the 50 people/km2 cutoff are defined as holdings between 10 and 15 hectares of wetland and between 12 and 20 hectares of
dryland, following the discussion in section 2.2. The controls in even-numbered columns are important in this specification
because the island fixed effects help ensure that comparisons across threshold are made within-island. This matters given
that Java/Bali has very few districts at the 50 threshold, and the Outer Islands have very few districts at the 400 threshold.
Indeed, the parts of Indonesia that fall below the 50 threshold are mostly large and low density, forested areas of Sumatra
and Kalimantan as well as outlying islands, where the reach of the central Indonesian state at the time of the land reform was
limited. Hence, we would expect that this additional treatment effect adds considerable, relative to the effects around the 400
threshold, which are mostly on Java, home to the majority of the population and strong government institutions.
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disappear when examining a placebo discontinuity in density at 300 or 500 people/km2. These tables
help validate the identifying assumptions of the discontinuity input to our difference-in-discontinuity
strategy. Finally, A.3.5 demonstrates robustness to alternative polynomials in 1960 population density
(linear, quadratic, and quartic) besides the cubic specification used in the baseline estimates. Sixth, A.3.6
varies the bandwidth around the population density cutoff of 400 people/km2, ranging from 100 to 300.
At the lower end, we see the limits of the identifying variation afforded by the policy as we are left with
too few districts (45 out of 188) to conduct statistically well-powered difference-in-discontinuity regres-
sions with the required controls and associated interactions. We view these results not as illustrating
the fragility of our findings but rather the limits of the available identifying variation in this historical
setting. Overall, the stability of results points to the robustness of our findings and interpretation of the
long-run pathway from the attempted land reform to Islamic institutions and Islamist politics today.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides causal evidence of the effects of Islamic institutions on religious politics and the
spread of Islamism. Our results suggest that a major Islamic institution, the waqf, played a dispropor-
tionately important role at a critical juncture in Indonesian history. The 1960 land reform exempted re-
ligious lands from redistribution, prompting rural landowners to transfer their holdings to waqf estates
to avoid seizure by the government. Since waqf lands are primarily used for religious purposes, this
episode cemented the social standing of Indonesian rural elites and solidified the alliance between these
elites and the Islamist movement, despite the fact that waqf were and remain a small fraction of rural
land. We show that waqf lands as well as Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) are found in much greater
numbers in areas targeted by the 1960 land reform, and we argue that this local variation in the density
of pesantren is important for understanding contemporary variation in support for Islamist movements,
voters’ preferences for religious candidates, and adoption of sharia legal regulations by legislators across
Indonesia.
Our findings may also have generalizable implications for our understanding of the relationship
between religious institutions and the rise of religious politics in other societies. This pertains, first
and foremost, to support for political Islam in the Muslim World. While waqf estates represent a small
fraction of land in Indonesia, they are more intensively used in the Middle East, North Africa, and India,
where their impacts on the local organization of political Islam deserves further exploration. Beyond
Islamist politics, the literature on the economics of religion has generally not focused on the impact that
specific institutions play in shaping political activism by religious actors and organizations. In the same
way that waqf estates created as a result of the 1960 Indonesian land reform continue to influence the
course of Indonesian politics, institutions specific to other religious traditions may also condition the
ways in which religious actors engage in politics in the West, or in other parts of the developing world.
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Figures
Figure 1: Creation of waqf in East Java Province, reproduced from Djatnika (1985)
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Notes: This figure illustrates the number of waqf created in one of Indonesia’s largest provinces through 1979. The data
are collected by Djatnika (1985) from local Ministry of Religion archival records.
Figure 2: Illustration of the Differences-in-Discontinuity Design
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Notes: This figure illustrates how the difference in outcomes, here waqf land shares, between districts with high and low
numbers of marginal landholdings changes at the 400 people/km2 cutoff. We restrict attention to districts in the 250–600
people/km2 range for presentational purposes. The curves are local linear regressions with an Epanechnikov kernel and
bandwidth of 50. See Section 5.3 for details.
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Tables
Table 1: Prevalence of waqf after the Land Reform
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 4.496∗∗∗ 5.333∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 1.115∗∗∗ 6.059∗∗ 0.983
(1.339) (2.414) (0.141) (0.237) (0.231) (0.369) (2.919) (5.653)
Above 400 threshold -1.298 -0.556 -0.268 0.086 -0.178 0.132 -1.429 -4.550
(1.231) (2.250) (0.163) (0.208) (0.242) (0.311) (4.097) (5.206)
Large landholdings -1.841∗∗ -5.115∗ -0.114 -0.253 -0.281∗∗ -0.139 -0.500 -9.146∗
(0.927) (2.800) (0.109) (0.225) (0.137) (0.245) (2.915) (5.360)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
Dep. Var. Mean 3.450 3.450 0.672 0.672 0.520 0.520 6.133 6.133
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54743 54743 54518 54518
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1). Land under waqf status in 2003 is measured in hectares (ha) in columns 1-2, log ha in columns 3-4, as % of
total land in columns 5-6, and as % of legally zoned land in columns 7-8. Above 400 threshold is an indicator equal to one for districts above 400 people/km2 in
1960, and Large landholdings is an indicator equal to one for districts with above median number of landholders in the size categories subject to redistribution
according to the 1960 laws. Odd-numbered columns include a cubic polynomial interacted separately with the two land reform exposure variables, Above 400
threshold and Large landholdings. Even-numbered columns additionally include six island fixed effects and predetermined Controls (Xij), which include (i) pre-
land reform measures of the total male and female populations, the total amount of farms, irrigated land, and agricultural land (all measured in the early 1960s
at the district-level), (ii) time-invariant controls, including altitude, distance to the nearest district and subdistrict capital, and whether the village is located on a
hill or on the coast, and (iii) the vote share received by Islamic parties in the 1955 and/or 1957 elections. We further interact the Xij vector of controls with the
two land reform exposure variables.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table 2: Prevalence of Other Islamic Institutions
# Pesantrens # Mosques Any Zakat Org. % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 1.564∗∗ 2.061∗∗∗ 6.120∗∗∗ 6.549∗∗∗ -0.055 -0.115 0.055 0.037
(0.652) (0.595) (2.283) (2.026) (0.106) (0.154) (0.067) (0.113)
Above 400 threshold -0.790 -0.402 -2.082 0.002 0.066 0.416∗∗ -0.066 0.011
(0.632) (0.658) (1.471) (2.454) (0.108) (0.190) (0.061) (0.148)
Large landholdings -0.430 -1.148∗∗∗ -1.760 -7.917∗∗∗ 0.045 -0.137 -0.093 -0.407∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.415) (1.418) (1.910) (0.080) (0.131) (0.058) (0.116)
R2 0.16 0.28 0.21 0.33 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.57
Dep. Var. Mean 0.524 0.524 3.316 3.316 0.742 0.742 0.868 0.868
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 187 187
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54744 54744 45784 45784
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the number of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in the village in 2003 (columns 1-2), the number of
mosques in 2003 (columns 3-4), the presence of any formal Islamic alms and charity (Zakat) organization in 2003 (columns 5-6), and the share of the Muslim
population in 2000 (columns 7-8). The sample size drops in columns 7-8 as the data come from the 2000 Population Census and could not be linked to the baseline
2003 data for certain villages as a result of changes in administrative codes and boundaries. See the notes to Table 1 for additional details on the specification.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table 3: Islamist Party Support, First Democratic Election in 1999 for National Legislature
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 0.056 -0.032 -0.540∗∗ -0.614∗∗ 0.499∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005 0.009 -0.012
(0.050) (0.115) (0.246) (0.268) (0.205) (0.240) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.024)
Above 400 threshold -0.062 -0.377∗ 0.100 -0.455∗∗ -0.078 -0.200 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 -0.044
(0.060) (0.192) (0.148) (0.220) (0.152) (0.316) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.036)
Large landholdings -0.084∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗ 0.206 -0.010 -0.280∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.002 -0.046
(0.030) (0.133) (0.135) (0.177) (0.122) (0.260) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028)
R2 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.37 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Dep. Var. Mean 0.145 0.145 0.354 0.354 0.501 0.501 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.020
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for an indicator of whether a given political party finished in the top 3 in the 1999 national legislative elections as
reflected in the village vote share. Podes 2003 does not report these shares, but it does report top 3 rankings. The National Mandate Party (PAN) is in columns 1-2,
and the National Awakening Party (PKB) is in columns 3-4. These two parties have pluralistic ideologies that embrace Pancasila, the secular-inclusive doctrine
of the Indonesian state. These parties shun any desire for Islamic law, unlike the hardline Islamist parties in subsequent columns, which rejected Pancasila in
1999 and had platforms pushing for Islamic law as part of the Constitution. These include the United Development Party (PPP) in columns 5-6, the Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS) in columns 7-8, and the Crescent Star Party (PBB) is in columns 9-10. See the notes to Table 1 for additional details on the specification.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table 4: Islamist Party Support, District-Level Vote Shares in 1999 and 2009 National Legislative Elections
1999 Election 2009 Election
Islamist Moderate Islamic Islamist Moderate Islamic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 0.075 0.165∗∗ -0.133 -0.273∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.144∗∗ -0.072∗ -0.160∗∗
(0.056) (0.070) (0.100) (0.122) (0.047) (0.068) (0.043) (0.062)
Above 400 threshold -0.040 -0.095 -0.043 -0.288∗∗ -0.079 -0.239∗∗ -0.038 -0.185∗∗
(0.053) (0.120) (0.073) (0.123) (0.056) (0.099) (0.028) (0.076)
Large landholdings -0.043 -0.058 0.044 -0.027 -0.076∗∗ -0.150∗∗ 0.005 0.093
(0.034) (0.077) (0.068) (0.101) (0.032) (0.063) (0.027) (0.057)
R2 0.05 0.49 0.36 0.74 0.14 0.56 0.27 0.60
Dep. Var. Mean 0.117 0.117 0.172 0.172 0.125 0.125 0.113 0.113
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 184 184 184 184 187 187 186 186
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for Islamist party vote shares at the district level in 1999 and 2009. See the notes to Table 1 for additional details
on the specification and the notes to Table 3 for details on the party groupings.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors. Clustering by province leads to more significant results.
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Table 5: Effects on Religious Political Preferences, Individual-Level Survey Data
Is Candidate’s [...] Important
in Determining Vote for Mayor?
Religion Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 0.196∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.081) (0.085) (0.083)
Above 400 threshold -0.047 -0.023 -0.029 -0.029
(0.063) (0.099) (0.066) (0.101)
Large landholdings -0.069 -0.171∗∗ -0.053 -0.204∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.073) (0.066) (0.074)
R2 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
Dep. Var. Mean 0.392 0.392 0.409 0.409
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 46044 46044 46044 46044
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for: columns (1-2) whether respondents in the IFLS survey say the
religion of a candidate is important in their decision to vote for him/her; (3-4) whether they say the religiosity of a
candidate is important in the respondent’s decision to vote for him/her.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table 6: Effects on Policy: Sharia Regulations by District Governments
Any Regulation Legislative Regulations Executive Regulations Total Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 0.574∗ 0.471 0.682∗ 0.700 0.449∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗ 1.174∗
(0.315) (0.548) (0.384) (0.625) (0.238) (0.355) (0.435) (0.707)
Above 400 threshold -0.202 0.902 -0.143 1.000 0.062 0.810 -0.117 1.383
(0.244) (0.674) (0.249) (0.750) (0.172) (0.495) (0.289) (0.848)
Large landholdings -0.386∗ -0.215 -0.360 -0.645 -0.132 -0.334 -0.407 -0.725
(0.206) (0.537) (0.218) (0.529) (0.160) (0.265) (0.263) (0.583)
R2 0.07 0.33 0.12 0.38 0.10 0.34 0.12 0.40
Dep. Var. Mean 0.521 0.521 0.475 0.475 0.104 0.104 0.528 0.528
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for: columns (1-2) whether any Sharia regulations were adopted by local
government in the district between 1998-2013; (3-4) the log of one plus the number of Sharia regulations adopted by local
legislature in the district between 1998-2013; (5-6) the log of one plus the number of Sharia regulations adopted by the
local executive (bupati or mayor) between 1998-2013; and (7-8) the log of one plus the total number of regulations adopted
between 1998-2013.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
35
Table 7: Effects on Village Revenue from Different Sources (State vs. Civil Society)
% Public Land % Social Orgs. % Self-Help Groups % Private Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above threshold*Large landholdings -0.393∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.107
(0.181) (0.085) (0.050) (0.117)
Above 400 threshold 0.188 -0.054 -0.026 -0.153∗
(0.130) (0.098) (0.069) (0.086)
Large landholdings 0.260∗∗ -0.108 0.069 -0.296∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.102) (0.070) (0.089)
R2 0.45 0.08 0.17 0.10
Dep. Var. Mean 0.201 0.316 0.206 0.186
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188
Observations 46258 46258 46258 46258
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) based on the full control (even-numbered) specification used in Table 1
for the share of village government revenue in 2003 (Podes data) from publicly owned land (column 1), social organizations
(column 2), self-help groups (column 3), and private taxation (column 4). See the notes to Table 1 for additional details on
the specification.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table 8: Alternative Explanations (I): Land Inequality and Demographic Change
Changes in Landholdings Dispersion Missing People
∆λ ’63-’80 ∆λ ’63-’85 ∆λ ’63-’90 ∆pop., ’61-’71 ∆sex ratio, ’61-’71
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Above threshold*Large landholdings -0.296 0.026 -0.430 0.184 0.544
(0.920) (0.819) (0.752) (0.619) (0.806)
Above 400 threshold -0.682 0.554 -0.723 0.005 -0.551
(0.879) (1.063) (0.832) (0.942) (1.008)
Large landholdings 0.672 1.515 1.235 0.663 -0.629
(0.815) (0.945) (0.815) (0.989) (0.658)
R2 0.51 0.56 0.51 0.31 0.76
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 188 188 188 165 165
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) based on the full control (even-numbered) specification used in Table
1 for the following district-level outcomes, all of which are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one:
changes in district-level land dispersion between 1963–1980 (i.e., estimated Pareto parameters for total agricultural land,
higher λ means less dispersion/inequality) (column 1); 1963–1985 (column 2); 1963–1990 (column 3); district-level popu-
lation growth between 1961 and 1971 (column 4); and district-level growth in the sex ratio between 1961 and 1971 (column
5). The sample size is smaller in columns 4–5 due to uncovered districts in the 1971 Census. See the notes to Table 1 for
additional details on the specification.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table 9: Alternative Explanations (II): Development and Public Goods
λ: land dispersion shr. irrigated land pub. goods ag. productivity rice productivity lights HH exp./capita High Schools Post-Prim. Shr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Above threshold*Large landholdings -0.280 -0.350 -0.118 -0.146 -0.045 -0.075 0.526∗∗ 0.037 0.062
(0.239) (0.297) (0.197) (0.187) (0.078) (0.140) (0.258) (0.044) (0.284)
Above 400 threshold -0.275 1.327∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.114 0.151 0.865∗∗∗ 0.011 1.486∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.350) (0.279) (0.225) (0.159) (0.217) (0.301) (0.073) (0.407)
Large landholdings 0.302 0.026 0.010 -0.845∗∗∗ -0.133 0.377 0.090 -0.098 0.174
(0.236) (0.319) (0.256) (0.258) (0.083) (0.245) (0.314) (0.074) (0.387)
R2 0.41 0.32 0.40 0.18 0.00 0.73 0.11 0.01 0.28
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 174 188 184 188 187 184 185 188 187
Observations 35736 46427 40653 47014 45695 40667 33728 54744 45784
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) based on the full control (even-numbered) specification used in Table 1 for the following village-level outcomes, all of which are
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one: the estimated Pareto dispersion parameter λ for agricultural land using the universal 2003 Agricultural Census (column
1, higher λ means less dispersion/inequality); the share of land with irrigation based on the 2003 Podes (column 2); an average of indicators for whether the village has 5 public
goods including trash collection and all-wheel road access in the 2003 Podes (column 3); crop-specific, revenue-weighted total agricultural productivity in tons/ha based on the
2003 Podes (column 4); rice tons/ha in 2003 (column 5); share of the village with any nighttime light intensity in 2010 (column 6); average household expenditures/capita across all
households surveyed in the village in Susenas rounds from 1994 to 2011 (column 7); an indicator for whether the village has a high school in 2003 (column 8); the share of households
with any post-primary education in 2000 Population Census (column 9). The sample size varies across columns in this table as a result of different coverage across some of the data
sources (e.g., the Agricultural Census is not fielded in urban areas) as well as difficulties merging villages over time due to changes in administrative codes.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.37
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A Further Empirical Results
A.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD N
Historic Population density 254.26 407.44 54,744
Above 400 ppl/sq km threshold 0.282 0.450 54,744
Above median in large holdings 0.507 0.500 54,744
Holdings between 5-7.5 Ha 357.71 443.64 54,744
Holdings between 6-9 Ha 357.71 443.64 54,744
Male population (thousands) 235.36 151.03 54,744
Female population (thousands) 241.64 158.47 54,744
Farms(thousands) 68.86 41.58 54,744
Sawah area (Ha, thousands) 25.19 16.84 54,744
Agric. area (Ha, thousands) 77.58 51.83 54,744
Village located on hill 0.291 0.454 54,744
Altitude 290.11 1801.6 54,744
Village located on beach 0.101 0.301 54,744
Dist. to subdistrict office (km) 10.04 21.89 54,744
Distance to district office (km) 46.50 56.37 54,744
Islamic vote 1955-57 0.457 0.230 54,744
Waqf land in village (Ha) 3.450 39.79 54,339
Waqf land in village (Log Ha) 0.672 0.821 54,339
Waqf in village (% total land) 0.520 2.96 54,743
Waqf in village (% zoned land) 6.133 20.82 54,518
Pesantrens in village 0.524 1.254 54,339
Mosques in village 3.316 4.236 54,339
Zakat Group in village 0.742 0.437 54,744
% Muslim 0.868 0.298 45,784
PPP among top 3 parties 0.501 0.500 54,744
PKB among top 3 parties 0.354 0.478 54,744
PKS among top 3 parties 0.004 0.061 54,744
PBB among top 3 parties 0.020 0.142 54,744
Local sharia regulations 0.913 1.319 54,744
Executive sharia regulations 0.180 0.744 54,744
Total sharia regulations 1.093 1.689 54,744
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for dependent and independent variables used in the regression analysis. For
a full elaboration of sources and variable construction, see Appendix B.
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A.2 Identification Checks
Figure A.1: Population Density: McCrary (2008) Test
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Notes: This figure reports the McCrary (2008) test for manipulation of the running variable, population density in 1960.
The graph reveals no evidence of such manipulation. The figure excludes Jakarta, which has a population density above
2000 people/km2, for presentational purposes.
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Table A.2: Balance on Time-Invariant and Pre-Reform Covariates
Mean RD RDID
Male population (thousands) 235.36 -97.666 134.571
(92.343) (98.451)
Female population (thousands) 241.637 -114.122 125.608
(95.338) (99.819)
Farms (thousands) 68.858 -37.24* 12.669
(21.063) (25.406)
Wetland area (ha, thousands) 25.187 7.126 22.009***
(7.089) (8.696)
Agricultural area (ha, thousands) 77.58 -24.2 9.712
(21.316) (13.859)
Village located on hill .291 -.097 -.019
(.066) (.116)
Altitude 290.108 201.424 -165.089
(263.227) (238.543)
Village located on beach .101 -.033 .062
(.033) (.051)
Dist. to subdistrict office (km) 10.043 4.386*** .957
(1.766) (1.351)
Distance to district office (km) 46.497 11.278 2.499
(8.346) (7.029)
Islamic vote 1955-57 .457 -.145 .066
(.108) (.118)
Village in Sumatra .331 -.209* .011
(.109) (.079)
Village in Java .416 -.003 -.027
(.071) (.086)
Village in Bali .051 .036 -.003
(.043) (.071)
Village in Kalimantan .092 .134*** -.025
(.059) (.039)
Village in Sulawesi .11 .041 .044
(.055) (.059)
Notes: This table reports balance checks on baseline covariates (either time invariant or measured prior to the 1960 land
reform). Each cell reports estimates from a separate regression. Column (2) reports the mean of each dependent variable.
In column (3) we report the RD estimate from a standard RD specification where we regress the relevant variable on a
treatment dummy and a 3rd order polynomial in the running variable (historic population density) estimated separately
on each side of the cutoff. In column (3), we report a similar check using our baseline differences-in-discontinuity specifi-
cation in equation (1).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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A.3 Further Robustness Checks
A.3.1 Pooling Land Reform Intensity Discontinuities at 50 and 400 people/km2
The next three tables reproduce our three core Tables 1, 2, and 3 using two cutoffs used in the land reform
(50 and 400 people/km2) rather than only the 400 cutoff to define the discontinuity in equation (1).
Here the treatment and comparison groups for the 50 cutoff are districts with densities between 51-250
people/km2 and under 50 people/km2, respectively. The treatment and comparison groups for the 400
cutoff are districts with densities above 400 people/km2 and between 251-400 people/km2, respectively.
The results in even-numbered columns are larger and more precisely estimated as they remove cross-
island variation. This is important given that outside Java/Bali, there are very few districts for which
the 400 threshold applies, and on Java/Bali, there are no districts for which the 50 threshold applies.
Table A.3: Combining RD Cutoffs (50 and 400 people/km2) – Waqf
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large holdings 1.750∗ 2.601∗ 0.094 0.320∗∗ 0.024 0.447∗∗∗ 1.314 2.149
(1.017) (1.330) (0.110) (0.142) (0.138) (0.158) (2.606) (2.769)
Above relevant threshold (50 or 400) -2.954∗∗ -7.019∗∗∗ -0.156 -0.222 0.233 -0.482∗∗∗ 4.657∗ 8.833∗∗
(1.473) (2.467) (0.112) (0.158) (0.154) (0.170) (2.706) (3.809)
Large landholdings -0.377 -1.674 -0.077 -0.022 -0.263∗∗∗ -0.083 -1.437 -2.049
(1.191) (2.093) (0.078) (0.126) (0.055) (0.113) (2.096) (1.940)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06
Dep. Var. Mean 3.450 3.450 0.672 0.672 0.520 0.520 6.133 6.133
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54743 54743 54518 54518
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 1 based on pooling the RD cutoffs at 50 and 400 according
to the procedure described above. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table A.4: Combining RD Cutoffs (50 and 400 people/km2) – Other Islamic Institutions
Pesantrens Mosques Zakat group % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large holdings 0.546 0.847∗∗∗ 2.428∗∗ 3.485∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗ 0.085 -0.129 0.056
(0.332) (0.300) (1.066) (0.950) (0.107) (0.082) (0.097) (0.069)
Above relevant threshold (50 or 400) -0.411∗ -0.457 -2.477∗∗∗ -1.995∗ 0.049 -0.058 0.126 -0.080
(0.220) (0.318) (0.901) (1.157) (0.124) (0.121) (0.130) (0.129)
Large landholdings -0.350∗∗ -0.042 -1.278∗ -2.714∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.178∗ -0.042 -0.318∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.205) (0.764) (0.912) (0.086) (0.097) (0.089) (0.086)
R2 0.13 0.27 0.17 0.32 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.56
Dep. Var. Mean 0.524 0.524 3.316 3.316 0.742 0.742 0.868 0.868
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 187 187
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54744 54744 45784 45784
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 2 based on pooling the RD cutoffs at 50 and 400 according
to the procedure described above. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.5: Combining RD cutoffs (50 and 400 people/km2)– Islamist Party Support, 1999 Election
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Above threshold*Large holdings -0.039 -0.021 -0.207∗∗ -0.204∗∗ 0.122 0.287∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 0.019 0.014
(0.069) (0.066) (0.098) (0.102) (0.162) (0.115) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.017)
Above relevant threshold (50 or 400) 0.008 -0.043 0.027 0.011 -0.191 0.173 0.002 0.007 -0.044 -0.049
(0.096) (0.127) (0.085) (0.126) (0.194) (0.193) (0.003) (0.005) (0.032) (0.041)
Large landholdings 0.009 -0.118∗ 0.142∗∗∗ -0.113∗ -0.067 -0.139 0.001 0.002 -0.055∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.049) (0.070) (0.044) (0.067) (0.099) (0.103) (0.002) (0.004) (0.026) (0.030)
R2 0.02 0.07 0.28 0.36 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03
Dep. Var. Mean 0.145 0.145 0.354 0.354 0.501 0.501 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.020
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 3 based on pooling the RD cutoffs at 50 and 400 according to the procedure described above. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.43
A.3.2 Continuous Large Landholdings
The next three tables reproduce our three core Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively, redefining the large land-
holdings measure to be continuous number of holders rather than the above median indicator.
Table A.6: Continuous Measure of Large Landholdings – Waqf
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 1.665∗∗ 3.619 0.315∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 5.780∗∗∗ -0.619
(0.806) (2.570) (0.076) (0.239) (0.145) (0.369) (2.097) (5.844)
Above 400 threshold -0.205 0.904 -0.202 0.149 -0.051 0.189 -1.354 -0.738
(1.046) (2.071) (0.127) (0.208) (0.192) (0.282) (2.854) (4.787)
Large landholdings 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
Dep. Var. Mean 3.450 3.450 0.672 0.672 0.520 0.520 6.133 6.133
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54743 54743 54518 54518
Notes: This table reports a robustness check on Table 1 by allowing the large landholdings measure to be continuous rather
than binary above median.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table A.7: Continuous Measure of Large Landholdings – Other Islamic Institutions
Pesantrens Mosques Zakat group % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 1.003∗∗∗ 1.712∗∗∗ 3.716∗∗ 4.497∗∗ 0.009 -0.126 -0.081∗ -0.005
(0.271) (0.537) (1.753) (1.927) (0.056) (0.155) (0.042) (0.123)
Above 400 threshold -0.579 -0.045 -1.174 2.752 0.041 0.485∗∗ -0.015 0.213
(0.436) (0.656) (1.102) (2.562) (0.095) (0.193) (0.049) (0.147)
Large landholdings -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.16 0.28 0.20 0.32 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.56
Dep. Var. Mean 0.524 0.524 3.316 3.316 0.742 0.742 0.868 0.868
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 187 187
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54744 54744 45784 45784
Notes: This table reports a robustness check on Table 2 by allowing the large landholdings measure to be continuous rather
than binary above median.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.8: Continuous Measure of Large Landholdings – Islamist Party Support, 1999 Election
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Above threshold*Large landholdings -0.043 -0.054 -0.286∗ -0.576∗∗ 0.157 0.517∗∗ -0.000 0.002 0.010 -0.023
(0.038) (0.127) (0.158) (0.251) (0.132) (0.240) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.027)
Above 400 threshold -0.025 -0.245 0.006 -0.417∗∗ 0.048 0.099 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.027
(0.056) (0.171) (0.140) (0.205) (0.143) (0.289) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.030)
Large landholdings -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.38 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03
Dep. Var. Mean 0.145 0.145 0.354 0.354 0.501 0.501 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.020
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744
Notes: This table reports a robustness check on Table 3 by allowing the large landholdings measure to be continuous rather than binary above median.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.45
A.3.3 Simple Diff-in-Diff without the RD Terms
The next three tables reproduce our three core Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively, using a simple difference-
in-difference specification that omits the discontinuity polynomial terms in g(D) from equation (1).
Table A.9: Standard Diff-in-Diff – Waqf
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 1.298 2.709∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗ 2.224 4.544
(0.842) (1.629) (0.090) (0.190) (0.135) (0.300) (1.836) (3.055)
Above 400 threshold -2.172∗∗∗ -2.374 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.175 -0.030 -0.045 -5.517∗∗∗ -2.017
(0.484) (1.713) (0.048) (0.157) (0.088) (0.204) (0.885) (3.141)
Large landholdings 0.393 -0.381 0.017 0.034 -0.298∗∗∗ 0.023 0.551 -5.324∗
(0.610) (2.250) (0.052) (0.134) (0.070) (0.137) (1.500) (3.128)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Dep. Var. Mean 3.448 3.448 0.672 0.672 0.519 0.519 6.108 6.108
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193
Observations 54832 54832 54832 54832 55242 55242 55013 55013
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 1, omitting the discontinuity terms and estimating a
simpler difference-in-difference specification.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table A.10: Standard Diff-in-Diff – Other Islamic Institutions
Pesantrens Mosques Zakat group % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 0.939∗∗∗ 1.044∗ 2.412 1.457 0.083 0.148 0.116∗∗ 0.160∗∗
(0.284) (0.609) (1.672) (1.654) (0.059) (0.116) (0.053) (0.079)
Above 400 threshold 0.122 -1.427∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗ -1.263 0.129∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.017
(0.188) (0.370) (0.601) (1.428) (0.042) (0.105) (0.037) (0.096)
Large landholdings -0.162 -0.415∗ -0.371 -3.599∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.233∗∗ -0.089∗ -0.383∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.239) (0.624) (0.929) (0.052) (0.098) (0.051) (0.108)
R2 0.04 0.25 0.06 0.30 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.56
Dep. Var. Mean 0.520 0.520 3.311 3.311 0.743 0.743 0.867 0.867
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 193 193 193 193 193 193 192 192
Observations 54832 54832 54832 54832 55243 55243 46241 46241
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 2, omitting the discontinuity terms and estimating a
simpler difference-in-difference specification.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.11: Standard Diff-in-Diff – Islamist Party Support, 1999 Election
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 0.056 -0.032 -0.540∗∗ -0.614∗∗ 0.499∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005 0.009 -0.012
(0.050) (0.115) (0.246) (0.268) (0.205) (0.240) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.024)
Above 400 threshold -0.062 -0.377∗ 0.100 -0.455∗∗ -0.078 -0.200 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 -0.044
(0.060) (0.192) (0.148) (0.220) (0.152) (0.316) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.036)
Large landholdings -0.084∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗ 0.206 -0.010 -0.280∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.002 -0.046
(0.030) (0.133) (0.135) (0.177) (0.122) (0.260) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028)
R2 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.37 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Dep. Var. Mean 0.145 0.145 0.354 0.354 0.501 0.501 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.020
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 3, omitting the discontinuity terms and estimating a simpler difference-in-difference specification.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.47
A.3.4 Placebo Cutoffs for the RD Terms
The next six tables reproduce our three core Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively, using placebo cutoffs at 300
and 500 people/km2 rather than 400 to define the discontinuity in equation (1).
Table A.12: Placebo Density Cutoff (300 people/km2) – Waqf
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above 300 (Placebo)*Large holdings 1.279 3.063 0.003 0.274 0.156 0.339 -6.122 -4.140
(1.785) (1.957) (0.213) (0.258) (0.204) (0.274) (7.183) (4.139)
Density above 300/km2 0.707 -3.595∗ 0.246 0.237 -0.235 -0.263 6.756 -1.027
(1.321) (2.159) (0.190) (0.222) (0.185) (0.256) (5.769) (4.679)
Large landholdings -0.614 -6.072∗ 0.154 -0.102 -0.172 -0.108 6.407 -8.197
(1.461) (3.126) (0.165) (0.249) (0.142) (0.260) (6.326) (5.805)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06
Dep. Var. Mean 3.450 3.450 0.672 0.672 0.520 0.520 6.133 6.133
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54743 54743 54518 54518
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 1 based on a placebo RD cutoff at 300 rather than the
policy-relevant one at 400.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table A.13: Placebo Density Cutoff (500 people/km2) – Waqf
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above 500 (Placebo)*Large holdings -0.926 -2.081 -0.047 0.082 -0.316 -0.172 1.028 2.754
(1.883) (2.542) (0.193) (0.275) (0.350) (0.481) (3.702) (5.241)
Density above 500/km2 0.380 -1.988 -0.028 -0.254 -0.103 -0.390 -1.713 -5.587
(0.595) (1.670) (0.098) (0.191) (0.148) (0.309) (1.292) (3.397)
Large landholdings 1.108 -1.285 0.138 0.014 0.280 0.227 1.776 -8.027∗
(1.105) (2.826) (0.113) (0.250) (0.183) (0.335) (1.743) (4.815)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
Dep. Var. Mean 3.450 3.450 0.672 0.672 0.520 0.520 6.133 6.133
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54743 54743 54518 54518
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 1 based on a placebo RD cutoff at 500 rather than the
policy-relevant one at 400.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.14: Placebo Density Cutoff (300 people/km2) – Other Islamic Institutions
Pesantrens Mosques Zakat group % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above 300 (Placebo)*Large holdings -0.594 -0.197 -4.055 -4.046∗∗ -0.076 -0.469∗∗∗ 0.194 -0.104
(0.785) (0.510) (2.878) (1.611) (0.183) (0.153) (0.150) (0.102)
Density above 300/km2 1.097∗ 0.415 4.583∗∗ 4.437∗∗ 0.020 0.379∗∗∗ -0.173 0.142
(0.580) (0.564) (1.983) (2.142) (0.172) (0.127) (0.105) (0.118)
Large landholdings 0.776 0.256 3.951∗ -1.459 0.006 -0.064 -0.231∗ -0.298∗∗
(0.566) (0.355) (2.142) (1.828) (0.147) (0.128) (0.118) (0.128)
R2 0.15 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.58
Dep. Var. Mean 0.524 0.524 3.316 3.316 0.742 0.742 0.868 0.868
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 187 187
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54744 54744 45784 45784
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 2 based on a placebo RD cutoff at 300 rather than the
policy-relevant one at 400.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table A.15: Placebo Density Cutoff (500 people/km2) – Other Islamic Institutions
Pesantrens Mosques Zakat group % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Above 500 (Placebo)*Large holdings 0.554 0.506 6.591 5.484∗ -0.147 0.245∗ -0.124 -0.013
(0.626) (0.930) (4.827) (2.918) (0.116) (0.144) (0.082) (0.103)
Density above 500/km2 -0.036 -0.367 1.764∗∗ 4.380∗ 0.012 0.233 -0.003 -0.078
(0.262) (0.573) (0.864) (2.488) (0.066) (0.200) (0.039) (0.110)
Large landholdings 0.092 -0.299 -1.851 -5.915∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗ -0.153 0.051 -0.372∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.554) (1.581) (2.101) (0.064) (0.149) (0.049) (0.120)
R2 0.14 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.12 0.56
Dep. Var. Mean 0.524 0.524 3.316 3.316 0.742 0.742 0.868 0.868
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 187 187
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54744 54744 45784 45784
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 2 based on a placebo RD cutoff at 500 rather than the
policy-relevant one at 400.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.16: Placebo Density Cutoff (300 people/km2) – Islamist Party Support, 1999 Elec-
tion
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Above 300 (Placebo)*Large holdings 0.025 -0.157 0.146 0.142 0.075 -0.057 0.004 -0.006 -0.026 -0.058∗∗
(0.079) (0.117) (0.197) (0.147) (0.223) (0.234) (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) (0.027)
Density above 300/km2 -0.087 -0.230∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗ 0.336∗ 0.230 0.001 -0.005 0.019 -0.013
(0.082) (0.137) (0.118) (0.166) (0.171) (0.244) (0.003) (0.006) (0.016) (0.030)
Large landholdings -0.065 -0.118 -0.179∗ -0.412∗∗∗ -0.071 -0.315 -0.004 -0.010∗ 0.014 -0.009
(0.068) (0.111) (0.093) (0.152) (0.161) (0.241) (0.003) (0.006) (0.016) (0.030)
R2 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.39 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Dep. Var. Mean 0.145 0.145 0.354 0.354 0.501 0.501 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.020
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 3 based on a placebo RD cutoff at 300 rather than the
policy-relevant one at 400.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table A.17: Placebo Density Cutoff (500 people/km2) – Islamist Party Support, 1999 Elec-
tion
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Above 500 (Placebo)*Large holdings 0.051 0.139 0.059 0.390 -0.180 -0.301 -0.006∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.032
(0.074) (0.104) (0.334) (0.282) (0.267) (0.329) (0.003) (0.005) (0.025) (0.021)
Density above 500/km2 -0.007 0.165 -0.095 -0.449∗∗ 0.100 -0.529∗∗ 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.037
(0.048) (0.146) (0.119) (0.226) (0.116) (0.248) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.023)
Large landholdings -0.086∗∗ -0.170 -0.053 -0.075 0.056 -0.623∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.008 -0.014∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.037) (0.111) (0.172) (0.184) (0.151) (0.235) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.024)
R2 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.37 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Dep. Var. Mean 0.145 0.145 0.354 0.354 0.501 0.501 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.020
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Observations 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 3 based on a placebo RD cutoff at 500 rather than the
policy-relevant one at 400.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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A.3.5 Alternative Polynomial Specification in the RD
The next three tables reproduce our three core Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively, using different degrees of the polynomial in the running
variable (historic population density). Our baseline specification (equation (1) controls for a third-order polynomial in population
density. Here we report alternative specifications that control for a linear, quadratic, and quartic polynomial estimated separately on
each side of the 400 people/km2 cutoff, and interacted with large landholdings.
Table A.18: Alternative Polynomials of the Running Variable – Waqf
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 4.885∗∗∗ 5.605∗∗∗ 5.262∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗ 0.822∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗ 6.028 6.453 1.559
(1.745) (1.863) (3.115) (0.211) (0.216) (0.293) (0.326) (0.329) (0.388) (3.688) (3.976) (6.618)
Above 400 threshold -0.941 -1.855 -2.225 -0.033 -0.018 -0.043 -0.015 -0.018 -0.156 -1.800 -0.513 -6.959
(1.943) (1.963) (2.785) (0.187) (0.194) (0.267) (0.246) (0.261) (0.369) (3.750) (4.100) (5.219)
Large landholdings -2.603 -5.101∗ -4.357 -0.085 -0.292 -0.215 -0.086 -0.164 -0.354 -6.674∗ -7.918 -8.858
(2.144) (2.644) (3.243) (0.173) (0.227) (0.258) (0.169) (0.236) (0.280) (3.718) (5.376) (6.375)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06
Dep. Var. Mean 3.450 3.450 3.450 0.672 0.672 0.672 0.520 0.520 0.520 6.133 6.133 6.133
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Polynomial in Density 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54339 54339 54743 54743 54743 54518 54518 54518
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 1 based on alternative polynomials (1, 2, 4) of the running variable in population density in 1960.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.19: Polynomial of the running variable – Other Islamic Institutions
Pesantrens Mosques Zakat group % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Above threshold*Large landholdings 1.167∗ 1.365∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗ 4.139∗∗ 4.948∗∗∗ 7.888∗∗∗ 0.071 0.069 -0.202 0.124 0.123 -0.012
(0.593) (0.558) (0.654) (1.772) (1.800) (2.275) (0.124) (0.132) (0.179) (0.087) (0.093) (0.148)
Above 400 threshold -1.050∗∗ -0.988∗∗ -0.574 -2.974∗ -3.111∗ -1.596 0.375∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗ 0.478∗∗ -0.004 0.047 0.004
(0.428) (0.494) (0.686) (1.655) (1.814) (2.510) (0.140) (0.150) (0.220) (0.116) (0.121) (0.159)
Large landholdings -0.588∗ -1.312∗∗∗ -1.313∗∗∗ -6.393∗∗∗ -8.373∗∗∗ -9.315∗∗∗ -0.166 -0.119 -0.026 -0.358∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗
(0.338) (0.427) (0.491) (1.277) (1.910) (2.215) (0.101) (0.140) (0.174) (0.098) (0.112) (0.147)
R2 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.56 0.57 0.57
Dep. Var. Mean 0.524 0.524 0.524 3.316 3.316 3.316 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.868 0.868 0.868
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 187 187 187
Polynomial in Density 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4
Observations 54339 54339 54339 54339 54339 54339 54744 54744 54744 45784 45784 45784
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 2 based on alternative polynomials (1, 2, 4) of the running variable in population density in 1960.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
Table A.20: Polynomial of the running variable– Islamist Party Support, 1999 Election
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Above threshold*Large landholdings -0.027 0.001 -0.015 -0.260 -0.302 -0.745∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.017 -0.020 -0.000
(0.071) (0.083) (0.127) (0.237) (0.240) (0.272) (0.234) (0.227) (0.289) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) (0.030)
Above 400 threshold -0.245 -0.327∗∗ -0.434∗∗ -0.278 -0.306 -0.256 -0.273 -0.280 -0.452 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.054 -0.065∗ -0.041
(0.155) (0.165) (0.187) (0.170) (0.194) (0.267) (0.236) (0.269) (0.360) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.033) (0.037) (0.042)
Large landholdings -0.253∗∗ -0.242∗ -0.273∗ -0.041 0.047 0.097 -0.441∗∗ -0.767∗∗∗ -0.833∗∗ -0.005 -0.012∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.065∗
(0.121) (0.128) (0.161) (0.130) (0.175) (0.196) (0.196) (0.252) (0.326) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03
Dep. Var. Mean 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.020 0.020
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Polynomial in Density 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4
Observations 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744 54744
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 3 based on alternative polynomials (1, 2, 4) of the running variable in population density in 1960.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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A.3.6 Alternative Bandwidth in the RD
The next three tables reproduce our three core Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively, using a local linear specification with 3 alternative band-
widths around the 400 people/km2 threshold in population density: 100, 200, 300 people/km2 on either side of the cutoff.
Table A.21: Alternative Bandwidth – Waqf
Hectares Log Hectares % Total Land % Zoned Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1960 Pop. Density Bandwidth, people/km2 100 200 300 100 200 300 100 200 300 100 200 300
Above threshold*Large landholdings -1.517 1.046 6.165∗∗∗ 0.227 0.131 0.629∗∗ 0.540 0.670∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 7.979∗∗ 5.894∗ 2.833
(1.443) (2.373) (1.992) (0.338) (0.259) (0.252) (0.376) (0.391) (0.338) (3.242) (3.332) (5.066)
Above 400 threshold 9.921∗∗∗ 7.230∗∗∗ 0.637 0.492∗ 0.463∗ 0.321 1.440∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗ 0.024 6.047∗ 2.250 4.722
(1.456) (2.130) (1.947) (0.268) (0.266) (0.227) (0.383) (0.343) (0.338) (3.187) (2.237) (4.503)
Large landholdings 12.556∗∗∗ 1.386 -2.687 1.249∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.205 1.589∗∗∗ 0.706∗ -0.110 3.393 1.492 -1.666
(1.417) (2.704) (2.964) (0.300) (0.268) (0.312) (0.300) (0.388) (0.423) (3.111) (2.528) (4.053)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.19 0.14
Dep. Var. Mean 2.685 2.543 2.655 0.688 0.651 0.667 0.650 0.619 0.608 2.697 3.732 4.710
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 70 96 45 70 96 45 70 96 45 70 96
Observations 12010 18623 24269 12010 18623 24269 12019 18631 24295 12016 18629 24284
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 1 based on alternative bandwidth in the RD specification around the 400 people/km2 cutoff,
including 100, 200, and 300 people/km2 in 1960.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.22: Alternative Bandwidth – Other Islamic Institutions
# Pesantrens # Mosques Any Zakat Org. % Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1960 Pop. Density Bandwidth, people/km2 100 200 300 100 200 300 100 200 300 100 200 300
Above threshold*Large landholdings -0.230 3.125∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗ 1.763 7.372∗∗ 3.308 0.055 0.009 -0.085 -0.092 0.053 0.062
(1.267) (1.068) (0.616) (3.271) (3.543) (2.168) (0.285) (0.209) (0.160) (0.190) (0.129) (0.118)
Above 400 threshold -2.863∗∗ -0.863 -0.281 -1.368 -0.753 -2.026 0.246 0.175 0.144 0.125 0.224 0.079
(1.255) (0.899) (0.713) (4.441) (3.105) (1.929) (0.302) (0.286) (0.166) (0.256) (0.170) (0.099)
Large landholdings 0.796 -0.920 -0.691 -1.289 -1.951 -0.581 -0.153 -0.096 -0.053 -0.148 -0.100 -0.152
(0.943) (0.862) (0.658) (4.613) (3.457) (2.626) (0.405) (0.250) (0.188) (0.265) (0.166) (0.135)
R2 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.68 0.67 0.70
Dep. Var. Mean 1.178 1.076 0.968 5.165 5.398 4.957 0.818 0.816 0.807 0.969 0.955 0.947
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 70 96 45 70 96 45 70 96 45 70 96
Observations 12010 18623 24269 12010 18623 24269 12019 18632 24296 11940 18261 23680
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 2 based on alternative bandwidth in the RD specification around the 400 people/km2 cutoff,
including 100, 200, and 300 people/km2 in 1960.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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Table A.23: Alternative Bandwidth – Islamist Party Support, 1999 Election
Moderate Islamic, pro-Pancasila Islamist, anti-Pancasila
PAN PKB PPP PKS PBB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1960 Pop. Density Bandwidth, people/km2 100 200 300 100 200 300 100 200 300 100 200 300 100 200 300
Above threshold*Large landholdings -0.238 -0.025 0.014 -1.328∗ -1.447∗∗∗ -0.765∗∗∗ 0.286 1.224∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.010 0.012 -0.018 -0.010
(0.153) (0.119) (0.081) (0.659) (0.353) (0.277) (0.577) (0.265) (0.194) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.030) (0.020) (0.018)
Above 400 threshold -0.013 -0.052 -0.040 -0.515 -0.050 -0.278 0.135 0.302 0.421 0.015∗∗ 0.007 0.012 -0.035 0.003 0.010
(0.131) (0.100) (0.106) (0.453) (0.325) (0.293) (0.380) (0.313) (0.256) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.027) (0.019) (0.013)
Large landholdings 0.052 0.113 -0.017 -0.274 0.116 0.073 0.721 0.116 0.100 0.015 0.002 0.003 -0.019 0.026 0.033∗
(0.141) (0.114) (0.082) (0.556) (0.270) (0.260) (0.444) (0.260) (0.243) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018)
R2 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Dep. Var. Mean 0.079 0.087 0.100 0.655 0.615 0.562 0.498 0.481 0.522 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.010 0.011
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 45 70 96 45 70 96 45 70 96 45 70 96 45 70 96
Observations 12019 18632 24296 12019 18632 24296 12019 18632 24296 12019 18632 24296 12019 18632 24296
Notes: This table reports estimates of the specifications in Table 3 based on alternative bandwidth in the RD specification around the 400 people/km2 cutoff,
including 100, 200, and 300 people/km2 in 1960.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by 1960 district.
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B Data Sources and Construction
We describe here the key variables and data sources used in the paper.
B.1 Historic Population Density
We measure historic district-level population density using tabulations from the 1961 Population Census
available in island-level hard-bound report, Sensus Penduduk 1961 in the Central Bureau of Statistics
(Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS) library in Jakarta. The specific table that we use is titled “Sensus Penduduk
Republik Indonesia 1961. Angka Sementara Penduduk Indonesia Menurut Jenis Kelamin. Per Daerah
Tingkat II.” We use ArcGIS to construct the area of historical 1961 districts by amalgamating later districts
back to their 1961 boundaries. Using the resulting population density, we classify districts into the four
categories discussed in the paper.
B.2 Historic Landholdings
We measure the historic landholdings distribution and number of large holders using the 1963 Agricul-
tural Census conducted for the purposes of assessing landholdings in order to implement the stipulated
reform. We digitized district-level tabulations available in a report by BPS, Sensus Pertanian 1963, with
the table “Number of farms by size of area” (“Banjaknja usaha pertanian rakjat menurut golongan luas
tanah”). While the raw data from the Agricultural Census are no longer available, these tabulations pro-
vide sufficient granularity to estimate (with noise) the number of large landholders in each district that
would be affected by the land reform. For each district, we observe the number of holders with 0.1–0.49
hectares (ha), 0.5–0.99 ha, 1–1.49 ha, 1.5–1.99 ha, 2–2.99 ha, 3–3.99 ha, 4–4.99 ha, and greater than or equal
to 5 ha.
As detailed in Section 5.2, assuming that landholdings L follow a Pareto distribution with probability
density function λLλL−λ−1, we can estimate the number of landholders in different bins above 5 ha.
Given the Pareto formulation, the distribution parameter λ holds over all truncated segments of the
distribution. As such, we can use the bins below 5 ha to recover the shape of the distribution above 5
ha where we do not know the number of landholders in each affected size bin subject to redistribution
based on the four density cutoffs.
We proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the Pareto shape parameter, λ, for each district using
a maximum likelihood procedure for landholdings L ∈ [0.1, 5) ha. Second, we use λ̂ to back out the
number of landholders with 5–7.5 ha, 7.5–10 ha, 10–15 ha, and > 15 ha (for irrigated land) and 6–9 ha, 9–
12 ha, 12–20 ha, and > 20 ha (for dry land), following the stipulated cutoffs. Concretely, we multiply the
numberN5 of landholders in the≥ 5 ha bin by the share of the district’s total landholding distribution in
the given range based on the Pareto cumulative distribution function (e.g., for 5–7.5 ha, this is given by
[1− ( 57.5)λ̂]×N5). Note that the Pareto distribution happens to imply that, for a given λ, the number of
holders in the 5–7.5 ha range is equal to the number of holders in the 6–9 ha range as seen in Appendix
Table A.1.
Although we are not able to estimate these marginal landholdings separately by wetland and dry-
land, we are able to control for the total number of farms, total wetland area (ha), and total dryland area
(ha) using district-level tabulations elsewhere in the Sensus Pertanian 1963 report under the table titled
“Farm area, average size of Farm and Paddy area” (“Luas tanah Pertanian Rakjat dan luas panenan
padi”).
We measure the post-land reform distribution of landholdings using the 1980 and 1990 Population
Censuses as well as the 1985 Intercensal Survey (Supas). These are the first three Census/Inter-census
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rounds that include measures of total landholdings owned by each household. We use the samples
available on IPUMS International and estimate the Pareto landholdings dispersion parameter λ, for all
landholdings above 0.1 ha. These estimates are at the district-level, at which the population summary
statistics are representative, and hence directly comparable with the tabulations from 1963.
B.3 Contemporary Landholdings, Including Awqaf
We measure contemporary landholdings using the 2003 Agricultural Census. We use this universal
census data to estimate Pareto shape parameters, λ, for every village and also to construct a measure
capturing the share of all households with greater than 0.1 ha over which λ is estimated. See Bazzi
(2017) for details on the data and estimation procedure, which differs from that used for the coarser,
binned 1963 Agricultural Census data.
We use the 2003 administrative village census (Potensi Desa or Podes) to measure the total land area
under waqf status overall, as a share of total land, and as a share of zoned land.
B.4 Contemporary Islamic Institutions
We use the Podes 2003 data to construct village-level measures of Islamic institutions, including the num-
ber of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), the number of mosques, and the existence of a formal group
that collects zakat alms.
We use data compiled by Buehler (2016) to measure the number of Shari’a law-based regulations
implemented by the district government from 1998 to 2013. In particular, his Appendix 1 includes a table
breaking down the number of local Shari’a regulations of different types (originating in the legislature
versus executive or otherwise).
B.5 Electoral Outcomes
We draw upon several sources to measure historic and contemporary electoral outcomes.
First, we draw upon district-level vote shares by party from the national legislative elections in 1955,
1999, and 2009. These data were graciously shared with us by individuals that worked with Dwight
King. Several districts are missing data for the 1955 elections. We therefore supplement the 1955 legisla-
tive election data with data from the 1957 district legislative elections that were held in select districts.
We digitize the latter from raw electoral reports obtained from files shared with us by Donald Hindley.
Second, we use the 2003 Podes, which records the top 1, 2, and 3 ranked parties at the village-level in
the first post-Suharto legislative election held in 1999. Unfortunately, the vote shares themselves are not
reported.
We categorize parties based on conventions put forward in the political science literature on Indone-
sia, including numerous works by Dwight King and R. William Liddle as well as a seminal article by
Baswedan (2004) aligning parties in the post-Suharto era along a spectrum of Islamist leanings. In 1955
and 1957, we define Islamic parties as Masyumi, the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (Partai Serikat Islam
Indonesia or PSII), the Islamic Educators Association (Perhimpunan Tarbiyah Islamiyah or Perti), and Nahd-
latul Ulama (NU). While the first post-Sukarno election in 1971 saw several Islamic parties (NU, PSII,
Perti, and the Muslim Party of Indonesia), thereafter the Suharto regime allowed only a single Islamic
party in the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP).
From 1999 onward, we follow Baswedan (2004) in classifying Islamic parties along an Islamist spec-
trum ranging from the non-Islamist National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN) and the
National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB), both of which initially adopted the na-
tional ideology of Pancasila prior to the 1999 election when parties were allowed to choose whether or
57
not to embrace this for the first time in the post-Suharto era. The PKB is the successor to a large part of
the former NU political wing, which disbanded from the PPP in 1984. The Islamist parties include the
PPP, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS), and the Crescent Star Party (Partai
Bulan Bintang or PBB). All three parties rejected Pancasila, including the PPP which was forced to accept
Pancasila during the Suharto era. PBB claimed to be the heir to the Masyumi party, which was banned
in the late 1950s for its association with more radical Islamist uprisings, and PKS was newly founded in
1998.
In sum, the PPP, PBB, and PKS can be seen as traditional Islamist parties whereas the PKB and
PAN are Islamic albeit inclusive and non-Islamist in their orientation. While the particular leanings
of these parties change over time and until today, this rough breakdown lines up with most historical
and contemporary accounts by political observers.
B.6 Contemporary Religious Preferences
We use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) rounds 4–5 in 2007 and 2014/15, respectively, to measure
individual-level religious political preferences. These include the following questions: (i) In an election,
having a candidate with the same religion as yours makes it [...] to vote for him/her. (... is a 1 to 5
scale ranging from very likely to very unlikely; and (ii) In an election, if the candidates have the same
religion as yours, how important is the religiosity of a candidate in influencing your decision to vote for
him/her? A more religious candidate make [...] to vote for him/her. (... is the same scale as (iv)).
B.7 Sharia Regulations
We use data from Buehler (2016), Appendix 1, pp. 215–220 on the number of Sharia regulations adopted
by district between 1998 and 2013. We use all three variables provided in this dataset, namely the number
of local regulations (adopted by local parliaments), ii) the number of executive instructions and decrees
(adopted by local governments), and the total number of regulations, all of which are reported at the
district level.
B.8 Historic Demographics
We use the Sensus Penduduk 1961 report noted above to control for the total number of men and women
in each district as of 1960 before the land reform. We use the 1971 Population Census to construct age-
specific male-to-female sex ratios. The data come from IPUMS International, and we use the population
weights to go from the sample constructed by IPUMS to the historic district-level total male and female
population. We also construct district population growth between 1961 and 1971 using this data.
B.9 Contemporary Demographics
We use the universal coverage 2000 Population Census to capture the share of the population reporting
Muslim identity and the share with post-primary education.
B.10 Contemporary Governance
We use the Podes 2003 to measure the share of village revenue coming from four different sources: public
land, social organizations, self-help groups, and private taxes.
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B.11 Contemporary Development and Public Goods
We use the 2003 Podes construct several village-level proxies for development and public goods. These
include the share of total agricultural land with any irrigation, the total number of high schools per 1,000
people, rice productivity measured in output per hectare, and a potential-revenue-weighted measure of
total agricultural productivity (with price weights coming the FAO, see Bazzi et al. (2016) for details). We
also construct an index of locally provided public goods using all six Podes rounds from 1999 to 2014 and
covering clean water access, garbage collection, paved road access, kerosene cooking oil access, and road
lighting. This index is based on that used in Martinez-Bravo (2017). Following Henderson et al. (2012),
we capture a summary measure development based on the share of the village with any nightlights
as observed from NOAA satellites in 2000. Finally, we use the annual National Socioeconomic Survey
(Susenas) to measure household expenditures per capita for each village in each year when that village
happens to be included in the roughly 15 percent of sampled villages from 1994 to 2011.
B.12 Geographic Controls
We use the Podes 2003 data to construct the following geographic controls: indicators for whether the
village is located on a hill or on a beach, the altitude in meters, and the distance to subdistrict and
district capitals in kilometers.
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